Prospective Advice and Consent by Galbraith, Jean
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2012 
Prospective Advice and Consent 
Jean Galbraith 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Relations 
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Repository Citation 
Galbraith, Jean, "Prospective Advice and Consent" (2012). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1456. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1456 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884233
 
 
  
Article 
Prospective Advice and Consent 
Jean Galbraith† 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 247 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT ......................................... 251 
A. Timing ........................................................................................................................... 252 
1. Two Textual Meanings of “Advice and Consent” ............................................. 253 
2. From the Framers' Intent to Subsequent Advice and Consent ............................ 256 
3. Prospective Advice and Consent in the Washington Administration ................. 260 
B. Specificity ..................................................................................................................... 263 
1. Text, Separation of Powers, and Ditch-Digging ................................................ 264 
2. The Doctrine of Obligatory Ratification ............................................................ 265 
3. Broad Mandates in Practice ............................................................................... 268 
4. Limits on Breadth .............................................................................................. 273 
III. MULTI-TREATY PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT .............................................................. 274 
A. Propsective Advice and Consent for Repetitive Bilateral Treaties................................. 275 
B. Prospective Advice and Consent Instead of Ex Ante Congressional-Executive 
Agreements ................................................................................................................... 280 
C. Preserving a Veto .......................................................................................................... 283 
IV. SINGLE-TREATY PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT ............................................................. 286 
A. Today's Graveyard ......................................................................................................... 286 
B. Prospective Advice and Consent for Major Multilateral Treaties .................................. 292 
1. Improved Negotiating Power ............................................................................. 292 
2. Appeal to the Senate .......................................................................................... 294 
3. Feasibility .......................................................................................................... 298 
C. Examples ....................................................................................................................... 301 
1. Law of the Sea ................................................................................................... 301 
2. Climate Change ................................................................................................. 303 
3. Trade ................................................................................................................. 305 
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 307 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty Clause of the Constitution gives the President the “Power, by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
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thirds of the Senators present concur.”
1
 In theory, treatymaking traditionally 
proceeds in three steps: First, the President or his agents negotiate and sign the 
treaty; second, the Senate gives its advice and consent by a two-thirds vote; and 
third, the President ratifies the treaty. In practice, however, the Senate has 
earned its reputation as the “graveyard of treaties.”
2
 While minor treaties 
usually clear the Senate eventually, significant treaties—particularly 
multilateral ones—are often the subject of lengthy or endless delay. The 
Senate’s present backlog goes back decades (the oldest treaty pending before it 
is from 1949) and includes major treaties like the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants.
3
 
The specter of death in the Senate in turn limits U.S. bargaining power. If 
other nations believe that the United States will never become a party to a 
multilateral treaty under negotiation, then their incentives to listen to U.S. 
negotiators are greatly reduced. A former Legal Adviser to the State 
Department has recently described this as a “real problem in treaty 
negotiation,” explaining that “our negotiating partners have no confidence that 
the executive branch will necessarily be able to get a potentially controversial 
treaty through the Senate. That does undermine the negotiating effectiveness of 
our State Department and other negotiators.”
4
 
The Senate’s failure to advise and consent to important treaties has 
received substantial attention from academics over the last twenty years, 
including contributions from Bruce Ackerman, David Golove, Laurence Tribe, 
John Yoo, Peter Spiro, Steve Charnovitz, and, most recently, Oona Hathaway. 
But these scholars have all focused on one particular issue, namely, the extent 
to which treaties can or should be approved as congressional-executive 
agreements by a majority of both houses and the President rather than through 
the Treaty Clause.
5
 Little has been written about whether the Treaty Clause 
itself could be applied in a more efficient or effective manner.
6
 By contrast, this 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2. This phrase has a long history, see The Graveyard of Good Treaties, NATION, Mar. 15, 
1900, at 199, and is often linked in particular to the failure of the Treaty of Versailles. See, for example, 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 178 (1996). 
 3. Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty 
/pending/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
 4. Interview by Toni Johnson with John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Int’l and 
Nat’l Sec. Law, Council on Foreign Relations and Former Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 9, 
2010), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22614/us_trouble_with_start_and_other_ 
treaties.html. 
 5. See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 799 (1995); Steve Charnovitz, Using Framework Statutes to Facilitate U.S. Treaty Making, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 696 (2004); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 
(1998); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in 
the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and 
Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 
(1995); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001). 
 6. For a rare exception, see Ronald A. Lehmann, Note, Reinterpreting Advice and Consent: A 
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Article argues that the Treaty Clause provides the President and the Senate with 
considerably more flexibility than the conventional wisdom suggests—
flexibility that can strengthen the prospects for treatymaking under the Treaty 
Clause. 
Specifically, I argue that the Senate can, and in many circumstances 
should, give its advice and consent prior to treaties’ final negotiation, an 
approach that I term prospective advice and consent. The Senate would give 
prospective advice and consent through the passage of a resolution that, by a 
two-thirds vote, authorizes the President to make a treaty or multiple treaties 
that conform to whatever conditions are set out in the resolution. Provided that 
the negotiated treaty or treaties then conform to these conditions, the President 
could ratify without further action by the Senate. 
This approach would reverse the longstanding and almost entirely 
unquestioned presumption that the Senate’s advice and consent must follow the 
President’s submission of a final treaty text, an approach that I call subsequent 
advice and consent.
7
 As I show, however, this presumption stems from 
historical practice rather than from a constitutional mandate. In the nineteenth 
century, this presumption made good sense: the United States entered into a 
sufficiently low number of international agreements that the Senate could 
reasonably take them up one by one; the most important agreements tended to 
be bilateral rather than multilateral, so renegotiation to accommodate Senate 
changes was more feasible; and the Senate had not then developed its practice 
of delaying certain treaties for decades. As the preconditions have changed, 
however, it is time—indeed long past time—to rethink how the Treaty Clause 
is applied. Prospective advice and consent could considerably improve the 
processing of minor treaties. For major multilateral treaties, the use of 
prospective advice and consent would be more challenging but also more 
rewarding. I argue that for many such treaties, prospective advice and consent 
pegged to key U.S. negotiating objectives would both further U.S. negotiating 
power and have greater appeal for the Senate than does the present regime of 
subsequent advice and consent. 
Part I shows that prospective advice and consent is permissible as a 
matter of constitutional law. I examine the text of the Constitution, evidence of 
original intent, and evolving practice and argue that prospective advice and 
consent is constitutional, or at least as constitutional as are the present practices 
of subsequent advice and consent under the Treaty Clause and of congressional 
delegations to the executive through ordinary legislation.
8
 The briefly worded 
 
Congressional Fast Track for Arms Control Treaties, 98 YALE L.J. 885, 896-97 (1989) (proposing that 
certain treaties be approved through a fast-track process). 
 7. One further note on terminology: as I discuss infra Section I.A, historically, the Senate 
sometimes advised and consented to treaties both before and after their negotiation. With regard to these 
treaties, I will use the terms pre-negotiation advice and consent and post-negotiation advice and 
consent. 
 8. See infra Part I. I use the phrase “at least as constitutional” to acknowledge that scholars 
who doubt the constitutionality of subsequent advice and consent and of congressional delegations to the 
President might also doubt the constitutionality of my proposal. See, e.g., infra note 25 (describing the 
doubts expressed by historian Arthur Bestor as to the constitutionality of subsequent advice and 
consent). 
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Treaty Clause leaves great flexibility to the President and the Senate to work 
out their interactions—a flexibility broad enough to permit the Senate to give 
its advice and consent in advance of a treaty’s negotiation as a matter of timing, 
and to do so in broad-brush strokes rather than by approving the specific words 
that will make up the treaty. Indeed, as I will show, the Senate has given 
prospective advice and consent on rare occasions in the past, although these 
precedents are now almost entirely forgotten.
9
 
Part II argues that prospective advice and consent could significantly 
improve the treatymaking process for minor treaties. Around half of the treaties 
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent are what I call repetitive 
bilateral treaties—treaties that are made bilaterally with many separate nations 
that all closely resemble each other—for example, tax treaties aimed at 
preventing the double taxation of income or mutual legal assistance treaties 
designed to further cooperation in criminal investigations. The Senate’s 
present, individualized review of these treaties takes up Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee resources, slows the adoption of the treaties, and adds 
little value (particularly since the Senate approves virtually all of these treaties). 
Prospective advice and consent would eliminate these problems while giving 
the Senate a role in forming U.S. negotiating objectives: Rather than approving 
these treaties one by one after their negotiation, the Senate would instead give 
advice and consent in advance to any such treaties, provided that these treaties 
satisfy whatever conditions are set out by the Senate in its resolution of advice 
and consent. Perhaps even more importantly, the Senate could use prospective 
advice and consent to create an alternative to what are known as ex ante 
congressional-executive agreements, or international agreements authorized in 
broad terms by prior congressional legislation. Ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements are common—the United States enters into well over a hundred 
each year—but once Congress has authorized these agreements in general 
terms, it retains little power to object to any particular agreement in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha.
10
 As I show, however, Chadha 
does not apply to the Treaty Clause. Prospective advice and consent thus has a 
key advantage over congressional authorizations for ex ante congressional-
executive agreements: the Senate can prospectively advise and consent to a 
treaty conditional on its retaining a post-negotiation and pre-ratification right to 
“veto” the treaty later if the end result is objectionable. 
Part III considers the important role that prospective advice and consent 
could play in major multilateral treatymaking. At the international level, 
prospective advice and consent would strengthen U.S. credibility at the 
 
 9. For example, David Golove observes that while “it may be the case that the Senate could 
give its ex ante consent authorizing the President to conclude treaties on particular subjects in 
accordance with its stipulated requirements,” nonetheless “[t]o my knowledge, it has never done so.” 
Golove, supra note 5, at 1798 n.20. 
 10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down the one-house legislative veto); see 
also Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE 
L.J. 140, 145 (2009) (“[T]he authority to make such international agreements has proven to be nearly 
impossible to revoke once granted—not least because any effort to revoke or even amend a delegation 
can be vetoed by the President. Moreover, Congress retains strikingly meager power to oversee the 
agreements that are made.”). 
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bargaining table, thus potentially allowing the United States to obtain more 
favorable treaty terms. As a matter of the domestic allocation of power between 
the Senate and the President, prospective advice and consent would give the 
Senate its long-desired formal role at the negotiations stage and would likely 
lead to inter-branch interactions that are more collaborative and less critical 
than they currently are. Moreover, as it can with minor treaties, the Senate 
could structure its resolution of prospective advice and consent to reserve the 
right to review and reject the treaty after negotiation. I conclude by exploring 
examples of how prospective advice and consent might work in practice drawn 
from three of the most significant areas of public international law today: the 
law of the sea, climate change, and trade. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT 
In the fall of 1943, the Senate considered the Connally Resolution, which 
called for the establishment of an international authority dedicated to 
maintaining world peace.
11
 A few days into the floor debate, Senator Millikin 
from Colorado warned that the resolution could be read as advice and consent 
to a future treaty establishing such an authority.
12
 The very concept of 
prospective advice and consent startled his colleagues and triggered energetic 
debate. Some Senators thought that advice and consent could never 
constitutionally be completed until after a treaty was finalized;
13
 others thought 
that prospective advice and consent would be constitutional only if the 
subsequent treaty used the exact language considered by the Senate;
14
 and still 
others concluded that prospective advice and consent would be constitutional, 
at least as long as the terms of the advice and consent had a reasonable degree 
of particularity.
15
 The issue came up again and again over the following week 
 
 11. S. 192, 78th Cong., 89 CONG. REC. 9222 (1943). For the text of the Connally Resolution as 
it was first introduced on the floor, see 89 CONG. REC. 8620 (1943). For more background, see PHILIP J. 
BRIGGS, MAKING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 24-34 (1991); and Ackerman & Golove, supra note 5, at 
881-83. See also RANDALL BENNETT WOODS, FULBRIGHT: A BIOGRAPHY 80-84 (1995) (describing the 
earlier and similar Fulbright Resolution in the House, which Senator Tom Connally, the Chair of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, viewed as impinging on the Senate’s constitutional prerogatives). 
 12. 89 CONG. REC. 8744-46 (1943) (statement of Sen. Millikin). 
 13. The most sophisticated proponents of this view distinguished between “advice” and 
“consent,” and asserted that “consent” had to come after a treaty’s negotiation. Id. at 8998-99, 9001 
(statement of Sen. Thomas); see also id. at 9205 (statement of Sen. Wherry) (distinguishing between 
“advice” and “consent” and concluding that “[o]nly is consent given a treaty when it is brought to the 
Senate for ratification”); id. at 9001 (statement of Sen. Murdock) (asserting that “advice” and “consent” 
are separate functions and that even after advice has been given by a two-thirds margin, “any proposed 
treaty must come back for the Senate’s consent before it becomes effective”). 
 14. Id. at 8803 (statement of Sen. Burton) (“I can recognize the possibility of a legal argument 
that our action was so specific and concrete that someone might interpret it as advice and consent before 
the document was before us, that it so clearly describes the document that it might just as well have been 
before us.”); see also id. at 8897 (statement of Sen. Connally) (“I quite readily agree that if the Senate 
now or at any time should set forth in a resolution specific terms, and quote the exact language of a 
treaty, and say to the President, ‘You are authorized to negotiate this treaty,’ that would be consent, and 
consent in advance . . . . [T]hat is the only instance in which the Senate could agree in advance”). 
 15. Id. at 8744 (statement of Sen. Pepper) (considering that prospective advice and consent 
might be constitutional if “it may have particularized before the act itself, as to what was to be done, 
sufficiently so that a person might fairly say that the Senate advised and consented to it”); see also id. at 
8899 (statement of Sen. Bushfield) (“Nothing in the Constitution instructs us as to whether that advice 
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of debate, until Senator Connally introduced an amendment clarifying that the 
Senate would need to give advice and consent down the road to “any treaty 
made to effect the purposes of this resolution.”
16
 
Now almost entirely forgotten, this debate showcases the two key issues 
regarding the constitutionality of prospective advice and consent. The first is a 
formalistic question of ordering: Does the Treaty Clause require that the Senate 
consider a treaty after its negotiation and before its ratification, or do the 
President and the Senate instead have flexibility as to when the Senate plays its 
role? The second is functional: Does the Constitution require the Senate to 
approve the precise text of a treaty, or can the Senate give its advice and 
consent to the President in more general terms (and if so, how general can these 
terms be)? 
In this Part, I address these two issues, which I call timing and specificity, 
and defend the broader positions on each. Importantly, I do not seek to ground 
my argument in any single theory of constitutional interpretation, such as some 
variant of textualism, original intent, or the living Constitution. Rather, my aim 
is to show that whatever the theory, prospective advice and consent is either 
constitutional or at least as constitutional as are widely accepted current 
practices—such as the President’s right to negotiate treaties without consulting 
the Senate beforehand and Congress’s ability to delegate substantial authority 
to the President. To this end, I draw from a range of materials, including the 
text of the Constitution, sources relating to its drafting and ratification, the 
international law of treatymaking at the time of the Framing, and subsequent 
practice. 
A. Timing 
In this Section, I show that the Treaty Clause entrusts the President and 
the Senate with discretion to work out the whens and hows of their interactions, 
and this discretion is broad enough to permit the Senate’s advice and consent 
before the negotiation of a treaty. This broad discretion stems primarily from 
the flexibly worded text of the Treaty Clause. It is further confirmed by the 
pragmatic approach taken by the Washington Administration, which employed 
either prospective or subsequent advice and consent, and sometimes both. 
The Senate’s “advice and consent” is now taken as a matter of course to 
refer to a post-negotiation, pre-ratification vote.
17
 This is true as a matter of 
 
[and consent] shall be given before or after making of the treaty . . . . [And the Connally Resolution] 
standing alone asks us to direct the President to make whatever treaty he sees fit without further advice 
or consent of the Senate to accomplish the things stated in the resolution.”); id. at 9002 (statement of 
Sen. Wheeler) (“[I]f we adopt the resolution by a two-thirds majority, then in my judgment it can be 
held to be not only advice to the President, but both advice and consent, because there is no question that 
we consent in general terms . . . .”). 
 16. Id. at 9066 (statement of Sen. Connally); cf. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 5, at 882-83 
(discussing how this amendment relates to the contentious issue of whether a congressional-executive 
agreement could be used as an alternative to the Treaty Clause). 
 17. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
303 reporter’s note 3 (1987); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 2 (2001) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]; CURTIS 
BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 337 (2003); 
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longstanding practice, but some commentators go further and describe the 
timing of the Senate’s role as constitutionally mandated, so that, as Senator 
Orrice Murdock asserted during the debates over the Connally Resolution, “any 
proposed treaty must come back for the Senate’s consent before it becomes 
effective.”
18
 (Some even refer to the Senate’s constitutional role as one of 
ratification,
19
 even though the President is responsible for ratification and has 
sometimes declined to ratify treaties to which the Senate has advised and 
consented.
20
) As this Section shows, however, this position is wrong: There are 
no persuasive grounds for treating the timing of advice and consent as 
constitutionally determined. Indeed, traces of prospective advice and consent 
can be found throughout the history of U.S. treatymaking. 
1. Two Textual Meanings of “Advice and Consent” 
The twenty-five words of the Treaty Clause leave open significant 
questions of process and therefore power. The Framers did not embellish the 
Clause with the degree of detail used for the Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clause, which identifies the precise actions to be taken by each political branch, 
specifies the order of these actions, and provides an elaborate contingency 
tree.
21
 Instead, they simply gave the President the power to “make treaties”—a 
phrase whose breadth seems to allocate the dominant role to him—and the 
Senate the obligation of “advice and consent” by a two-thirds vote. 
As a textual matter, “advice and consent” can be read in two main ways, 
one of which contains an implicit timing scheme and the other of which does 
not. The first way is to treat “advice” and “consent” as two separate stages, 
with advice occurring at least once and possibly continuously before or during 
a treaty’s negotiation and consent occurring after the treaty has been finalized.
22
 
 
HENKIN, supra note 2, at 177-78. Commentators typically do not even consider the possibility of 
prospective advice and consent. The only modern exception I have come across is David Golove, who 
notes the possibility in a footnote. Golove, supra note 5, at 1798 n.20. 
 18. 89 CONG. REC. 9001 (1943); see also, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1517 (1833) (suggesting that while pre-negotiation 
consultation is optional, “the exercise of the power of advice and consent . . . after the treaty was 
formed” is obligatory); Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate’s Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: 
Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1481, 1485-86 (1989) (asserting 
that the “constitutional solution” was to give the President the negotiating role and the Senate a 
reviewing role); sources cited supra note 13. 
 19. The Supreme Court sometimes makes this mistake in dicta. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 955 (1983) (“The Senate alone was given unreviewable power [under the Constitution] to ratify 
treaties negotiated by the President.”); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 596 (1912) 
(“[U]nder the Constitution . . . a treaty must be ratified by a two-thirds vote of [the Senate.]”). 
 20. ROYDEN J. DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE: A STUDY IN TREATY MAKING 
184, 349-50 (1933). I use “ratification” loosely throughout to cover both the signing and sealing of the 
instrument of ratification and the exchange or deposit of this instrument. 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 22. One could also treat “advice” and “consent” as separate things that can be satisfied at the 
same time—i.e., the Senate “advises” the President to negotiate for certain terms and “consents” 
conditional on these terms being satisfied; or the Senate “consents” to a prepared treaty and “advises” 
the President on whether and how to ratify it. See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State 
Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1167 (2000) (suggesting the latter); see 
also infra note 33. As a practical matter, this reading would have the same effect as the second reading 
that I discuss in the main text, and so I do not discuss it further. 
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Various senators embraced this two-stage approach during the debates over the 
Connally Resolution, and more recently it can be found in the work of 
luminaries such as Louis Henkin.
23
 This interpretation draws heavily from the 
canon against superfluities—as Raoul Berger once argued, “[u]nless ‘advice’ is 
. . . understood [to refer to pre-negotiation consultation with the Senate], it is 
superfluous; it would have sufficed to require only Senate ‘consent’ for the 
‘making’ of a treaty.”
24
 For those who accept this interpretation, prospective 
advice and consent will be incompatible with the text of the Treaty Clause—but 
no more incompatible than is the present practice of subsequent advice and 
consent. There is no textual basis for treating “advice” as optional but 
“consent” as mandatory. If a textualist is willing to overlook “advice” provided 
“consent” is given, she should be equally willing to overlook “consent” 
provided “advice” is given. 
The second reading of “advice and consent” is to treat it as a unitary 
phrase rather than as two separate nouns implying two distinct stages. This 
reading does not link “advice and consent” to a particular stage of the 
treatymaking process and thus is compatible with either prospective or 
subsequent advice and consent. In my view, this reading is the better one for 
three reasons. 
First, historian Arthur Bestor has persuasively shown that “advice and 
consent” was often used as a single phrase in English and American eighteenth-
century governance.
25
 English statutes at the time began with the language “be 
 
 23. See Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 409 
(1989) (treating “advice” and “consent” separately); sources cited supra note 13; see also, e.g., 
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 5, at 904 (treating “advice” and “consent” as separate concepts); Louis 
Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1989) 
(considering that the term “advice” would be superfluous if the Senate was only intended to have a post-
negotiation role); John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 
VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 198 (2001) (discussing the “consent portion” of the Treaty Clause as distinct from 
an advice portion). Early in the twentieth century, the influential Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and his 
colleague Augustus Bacon advocated this view in their writings. See Henry Cabot Lodge, The Treaty-
Making Power of the Senate, in A FIGHTING FRIGATE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 219, 231-32 
(1902); Augustus O. Bacon, The Treaty-Making Power of the President and Senate, 182 N. AM. REV. 
502, 506 (1906). 
 24. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 123 (1974). Although 
I have not seen it made, the drafting history of the Constitution suggests a further possible argument in 
favor of the two-stage position. As reported out by the Committee on Postponed Parts on September 4, 
1787, and debated and agreed to by the delegates as a whole, the draft Treaty Clause read: “The 
President by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties . . . . But 
no Treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.” 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 498-99 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION]. Only later, through the work of the Committee on Style, was the last clause 
changed to its present form of “provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.” Id. at 599. The 
earlier version references “consent” twice but “advice” only once, and thus suggests a difference 
between “advice” and “consent.” But it is difficult to gauge the significance of this point, especially 
since, in substituting “concur” for the second “consent,” the Committee on Style might have sought to 
eliminate that difference. 
 25. Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the 
Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 543, 545 (1974) [hereinafter Bestor, 
Separation of Powers]. Oddly, despite this showing, Bestor was a firm proponent of the two-stage 
approach, arguing that “[i]f language is used rationally, ‘advice’ means counsel offered before a decision 
is reached; ‘consent’ means acceptance of a proposed course of action after plans have been worked out 
in detail and are ready to be carried out.” Id. at 540; see also Arthur Bestor, “Advice” from the Very 
Beginning, “Consent” When the End Is Achieved, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 718, 726 (1989) (making a similar 
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it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, in the present 
Parliament assembled.”
26
 In the American colonies and later states, the words 
were also used as a phrase, typically to describe the interactions between 
governors and their executive councils.
27
 The common use of “advice and 
consent” as a single phrase undermines the likelihood that the words were 
endowed with separate meanings. 
Second, the text of the Appointments Clause, which immediately follows 
the Treaty Clause, suggests that the Framers consciously viewed “advice and 
consent” as a single act. That clause provides that the President “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint” officers of the United States.
28
 It is hard to interpret “advice and 
consent” here as anything except a unitary act. The wording makes clear that 
the Senate plays a part only in confirming appointments, not in making 
nominations, and there is thus no meaningful role for advice separate from 
consent. Of course, as Berger and others have pointed out, while the 
Appointments Clause distinguishes between nominations and appointments, the 
Treaty Clause does not separate out treaty negotiation and ratification but 
instead only speaks in general terms of “mak[ing] treaties”—a phrase that 
encompasses the entire process.
29
 The most textually consistent interpretation 
of this difference, however, is not to read “advice and consent” as meaning two 
stages for treaty purposes and one stage for appointments purposes, as Berger 
would do,
30
 but rather to read it as referring to a single stage for purposes of 
both clauses, a stage that can be fulfilled at any time during treatymaking but 
only after nominations in the appointments context. 
Third, “advice and consent” was frequently used as a unitary phrase in 
 
point regarding advice). Eager for all arguments in favor of a dominant Senate role in treatymaking, 
Bestor emphasized that “advice and consent” was a term of art in arguing that the Senate was supposed 
to act more as a powerful executive council than as a legislative body with regard to treatymaking, see 
id. at 725-26, but then ignored how the phrase’s term-of-art status undercuts the canon against 
superfluities. 
 26. Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 25, at 541-42; see also id. at 542-44 (discussing 
the phrase’s use in the Privy Council). During the debate over the Connally Resolution, Senator Thomas 
acknowledged this point, observing that “[a]dvice and consent have been deemed by practically all our 
Executives to be a single act . . . . Very likely they were a single act when the words were taken from 
British constitutional law and incorporated into our law.” 89 CONG. REC. 8998 (1943). He nonetheless 
preferred a two-stage interpretation. See id. at 9000. 
 27. See Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 25, at 545-46; Howard R. Sklamberg, The 
Meaning of “Advice and Consent”: The Senate’s Constitutional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 445, 447-50 (1997); see, e.g., 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 
636 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter JCC]; Adam J. White, Towards the Framers’ Understanding 
of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 137-38 
(2006) (examining uses of the phrase “advice and consent” by the Massachusetts Council in the 
appointments context in 1780-1781 and 1786-1787 and finding that the Council consistently used this 
unitary phrase in approving nominations). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 29. BERGER, supra note 24, at 122-23; Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and 
President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties—The Original Intent of the Framers of the 
Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 117 (1979) [hereinafter Bestor, Respective 
Roles]; Lodge, supra note 23, at 231-32. 
 30. BERGER, supra note 24, at 122-24; see also Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 29, at 
117-18; Lodge, supra note 23, at 231-32. 
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early references to the Treaty Clause. John Jay used it this way in Federalist 
No. 64, when he observed that 
For [preparatory decisions during negotiations] the President will find no 
difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur which requires the 
advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we 
see that the constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have 
every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and 
deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and dispatch on the 
other.31 
Here, Jay applied the phrase “advice and consent” to refer to a single act to be 
taken by the Senate—in this case, to be taken during treaty negotiations rather 
than after the completion of negotiations. Similarly, the Senate Executive 
Journal entries during the Washington Administration frequently employed 
“advice and consent” or “advise and consent” as a single phrase in relation to 
treaties. With regard to the first treaty negotiated during the Washington 
Administration, for example, the Journal used this phrase three times during the 
Senate’s pre-negotiation treaty deliberations
32
 and once during its post-
negotiation deliberations.
33
 This unitary use has continued over history and 
remains the practice today.
34
 
Although context and structure thus favor the unitary phrase 
interpretation over the two-stage interpretation, as I show in the next Section, 
the Framers probably anticipated that “advice and consent” would be given 
more than once over the process of treatymaking, in a manner functionally akin 
to the two-stage “advice” and “consent” interpretation. This expectation proved 
inconvenient to put into practice, however, and by the end of the Washington 
Administration, treatymaking tended to involve the Senate’s “advice and 
consent” only after a treaty’s negotiation. 
2. From the Framers’ Intent to Subsequent Advice and Consent 
The notes from the Constitutional Convention provide no clear evidence 
concerning how the President and Senate were intended to interact in 
treatymaking. While there was considerable debate about the exclusion of the 
 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 32. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (entry of Aug. 22, 1789) (describing the 
President as coming to the Senate “for their advice and consent” with regard to negotiating instructions 
for a treaty with the Creek Indians); id. at 22 (stating “[w]hereupon the Senate proceeded to give their 
advice and consent”); id. at 24 (describing the Senate as having “agreed to advise and consent” to a 
particular pay-off to the Indians). But see id. at 21 (recording that the President requested only the 
“advice” of the Senate). 
 33. Id. at 61-62 (entry of Aug. 12, 1790) (describing the Senate as acting on the question of 
whether “to advise and consent to the ratification” of the Indian treaty and resolving that “the Senate do 
consent to the aforesaid treaty, and do advise the President of the United States to ratify the same”); see 
also id. at 58 (entry of Aug. 7, 1790) (containing Washington's letter requesting further Senate advice 
and consent). For other uses of “advice and consent” or “advise and consent” in relation to treaties, see 
id. at 61 (entry of Aug. 11, 1790); id. at 116 (entry of Mar. 26, 1792); and id. at 170 (entry of Jan. 9, 
1795). 
 34. In current practice, Senate resolutions of advice and consent typically begin with the 
language “Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and 
consent to the ratification.” BETSY PALMER, CONG. RES. SERV., SENATE CONSIDERATION OF TREATIES 
1 (2009). 
 
2012] Prospective Advice and Consent 257 
  
House of Representatives and about the two-thirds requirement, the Framers 
engaged in little recorded discussion over how the President and Senate should 
fulfill their respective roles.
35
 It was not until the debates over the 
Constitution’s ratification that the intended interplay between the President and 
the Senate was discussed in any detail. Even here, the evidence leaves room for 
what historian Jack Rakove has described as “an exemplary constitutional 
puzzle,”
36
 but it does provide strong indications that the Senate was intended to 
give “advice and consent” to negotiating objectives and probably also to sign 
off on finalized treaties. 
Although rarely cited in this context, Federalist No. 84 contains perhaps 
the clearest view of how the Treaty Clause was projected to work in practice. In 
a brief aside, Alexander Hamilton described the President as conducting 
“foreign negotiations . . . according to general principles concerted with the 
Senate, and subject to their final concurrence.”
37
 His position that the Senate 
was to be consulted at the negotiating stage was widely shared, as reflected in 
Jay’s view in Federalist No. 64
38
 and in speeches made at various ratification 
conventions. In one example, Chancellor Robert Livingston defended the 
Senate’s six-year terms at the New York Convention by observing that “[t]hey 
are to form treaties with foreign nations: This requires a comprehensive 
knowledge of foreign politics, and an extensive acquaintance with characters, 
whom, in this capacity, they have to negociate [sic] with.”
39
 Hamilton’s further 
view that the Senate should play a role after a treaty’s negotiation was also 
voiced by several convention participants, including William Davie, who spoke 
in passing at the inconclusive North Carolina Convention of the Senate having 
 
 35. For detailed discussions of the Treaty Clause’s drafting over the summer of 1787, see W. 
TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS 
AND OLIVE BRANCH 74-99 (1981); Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 25, at 574-660; Bestor, 
Respective Roles, supra note 29, at 73-132; Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The 
Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, in 1 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233, 236-50 (Bernard 
Bailyn, Donald Fleming & Stephen Thernstrom eds., 1984). Remarks by Nathaniel Gorham and William 
Johnson on August 23, 1787 did emphasize the importance of making sure that the responsible branch at 
the ratification stage had also signed off earlier on the instructions given to negotiators. RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 392-93. Although these remarks were made before the 
President was given a role in treatymaking, they suggest an intent to have the pre- and post-negotiation 
roles go together. REVELEY, supra, at 89. 
 36. Rakove, supra note 35, at 236. Aspects of this puzzle include (1) how dominant a role the 
Senate was to play vis-à-vis the President in setting the agenda for treaty negotiations; and (2) to what 
extent the Senate’s role (and indeed the entire treatymaking process) could be considered executive or 
legislative. For the debate on the former question, compare Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 29, at 
113-24 (arguing for Senate dominance), with Swaine, supra note 22, at 1162-93 (finding the evidence 
equivocal and arguing for a reading that gives a stronger role to the President). For more on the latter 
question, see infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 31, at 519 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 31, at 391-92 (John Jay); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 75, supra note 31, at 450-51 (Alexander Hamilton) (appearing to assume a Senate role in 
negotiations). 
 39. 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1844 (John 
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also 6 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1326 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladiro eds., 2000) (recording the statement of a delegate at the Massachusetts Convention 
that the Senate was intended to act “in their executive capacity, in making treaties and conducting the 
national negociations [sic]”). 
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“the power of making, or rather ratifying, treaties.”
40
 As between the pre-
negotiation and post-negotiation roles of the Senate, there are no explicit 
statements as to which the Framers deemed more important. If anything, 
though, the evidence probably favors the greater importance of the pre-
negotiation stage, since the Senate’s role before negotiations received slightly 
more attention in the debates and, as I discuss later, the law of nations in 
relation to treatymaking at the time treated post-negotiation review as a mostly 
pro forma action.
41
 
The initial practice under the Washington Administration mirrored the 
approach sketched by Hamilton in Federalist No. 84. For the first treaties 
negotiated during his administration, Washington sought the Senate’s “advice 
and consent” both in drawing up instructions for the negotiators and prior to 
ratification. As is often recounted, Washington visited the Senate in person in 
August 1789 to consult on the very first treaty his administration sought to 
negotiate, one with the Creek Indians in the south.
42
 The encounter was by all 
accounts a disaster—the Senate was intimidated by Washington’s presence and 
sought to refer the matter to committee, while Washington went into a “violent 
fret”
43
 and gossip later put him as saying he “would be damned if he ever went 
there again.”
44
 
Dramatic as this story is, however, its use as a shorthand for the 
abandonment of the Senate’s role in treaty negotiations is vastly exaggerated.
45
 
As careful accounts acknowledge, Washington returned in person several days 
later for a more amicable follow-up visit and received the Senate’s “advice and 
consent” regarding the questions he had posed to it.
46
 While Washington did 
not visit the Senate in person for any other treaties, he asked the Senate for pre-
 
 40. 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 120 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1861) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS]. James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention and Charles Pinckney at the South 
Carolina Convention (like Davie, both delegates from the Constitutional Convention) also discussed a 
role at the ratification stage for the Senate, and both made remarks implying that the Senate was to be 
involved in the negotiation stage as well. See 2 RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 39, 
at 480, 491, 562-63 (Wilson); 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra, at 230, 625 
(Pinckney). Like Pinckney and others, Wilson also emphasized that “[n]either the President nor the 
Senate solely can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other and are so balanced, as to produce 
security to the people.” 2 RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 39, at 563 (Wilson); see 
also 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra, at 265 (Pinckney); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
66, supra note 31, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton); 9 RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
39, at 808 (Madison in a letter). 
 41. See infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 42. RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES: 1789-1817, at 18-21 (1970). 
 43. JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 131 (Edgar S. Maclay ed., New York, D. Appelton & Co. 
1891). 
 44. HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 23 n.4 (quoting an 1824 entry from John Quincy Adams’s 
Memoirs). 
 45. E.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 93 (1996); Ron Chernow, The Founding Fathers Versus the Tea Party, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
09/24/opinion/24chernow.html?pagewanted=all (suggesting that Washington went back to the Senate 
just “one more time before dispensing with the Senate’s advice altogether, henceforth seeking only its 
consent”). 
 46. E.g., BERGER, supra note 24, at 131; SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING 
AND ENFORCEMENT 55-56 (1904). 
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negotiation advice and consent in the early 1790s regarding a treaty with the 
Cherokees, a treaty with Spain, and a treaty with Algiers.
47
 With these treaties 
(as with the Creek Indian treaty), Washington returned again to the Senate for 
post-negotiation advice and consent, but the wording of at least some of the 
Senate resolutions giving pre-negotiation advice and consent made clear that 
this was merely a formality to the extent that the treaties complied with the 
prior advice and consent. In approving the negotiating instructions for the 
Spanish treaty, for example, the Senate unconditionally committed that it “will 
advise and consent to the ratification of such treaty as the said Commissioners 
shall enter into . . . in conformity to [the] instructions.”
48
 
In what must be one of the earliest departures from original intent, 
however, practical considerations caused Washington to cease viewing pre-
negotiation advice and consent as necessary for Indian treaties by 1793.
49
 His 
cabinet unanimously counseled against consulting with the Senate before 
negotiating the Treaty of Greenville with the Indians of Ohio, since they feared 
that the results of this consultation would leak out and “we would lose all 
chance of saving anything more at the treaty than our ultimatum.”
50
 In 1794, 
Washington made a similar decision with regard to a European treaty, 
consulting only with select Federalist senators rather than with the Senate as a 
whole on his instructions to John Jay for negotiating the controversial 
commercial agreement with Great Britain that became known as Jay’s Treaty. 
The trigger here was not merely frustration at the consultation process or 
concern about secrecy, but also fear that the Senate would not agree to any 
instructions at all.
51
 For these treaties, Washington simply sought subsequent 
advice and consent. The Senate, for its part, acquiesced in this practice by not 
rejecting these treaties outright on the grounds that they had been negotiated 
without its pre-negotiation advice and consent. 
During the nineteenth century, Presidents would occasionally consult 
 
 47. HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 31-34 (discussing the Cherokee treaty); id. at 40-57 (discussing 
the two European treaties). 
 48. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (entry of Mar. 16, 1792) (Spanish treaty); see 
also S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (entry of Aug. 11, 1790) (stating that if a new boundary 
were to be drawn with the Cherokees, “the Senate do advise and consent solemnly to guarantee the 
same”). 
 49. In effect, this is a very early example of what Keith Whittington calls constitutional 
construction between the political branches. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 1-19 (1999). 
 50. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Cabinet Meeting Proceedings (Feb. 26, 1793), available at 
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib007113; see also Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson, Alexander 
Hamilton, Henry Knox & Edmund Randolph, Cabinet, to George Washington (Feb. 25, 1793), available 
at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mgw4&fileName=gwpage103.db&recNum=240 
(recording unanimous agreement on this issue). 
 51. HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 70-72. An attempt in the Senate to force consultation on Jay’s 
instructions was voted down. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 3d Cong., 8th Sess. 151 (entry of Apr. 17, 1794). For 
more background on Jay’s Treaty and the role of the Senate, see JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: 
POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 125-34, 159-66 (1970). According to John 
Marshall, after Jay’s Treaty was negotiated and its terms made public, some of its opponents attacked 
Washington as having “violated the constitution in negotiating a treaty without the previous advice of 
the senate, . . . [an act] for which an impeachment was publicly suggested . . . .” 5 JOHN MARSHALL, 
THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (1926). 
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formally with the Senate prior to negotiating or signing treaties.
52
 But 
Presidents rarely consulted formally with the Senate, and the Senate rarely 
sought to weigh in unsolicited, at the negotiation stage.
53
 As Edwin Corwin 
later observed, a change in the “working constitution” had been effected,
54
 and 
by 1936, Justice Sutherland would state for the Court in sweeping dicta that, 
although the President “makes treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate . . . he alone negotiates [and] [i]nto the field of negotiation the Senate 
cannot intrude . . . .”
55
 
The privileging of subsequent advice and consent that occurred during the 
Washington Administration came about for the practical reasons of secrecy and 
expediency. That practice is thus best understood not as fixing subsequent 
advice and consent as the sole constitutional process, but rather as establishing 
that the minimalist language of the Treaty Clause leaves the political branches 
with considerable room for maneuvering. As Ralston Hayden stated: 
[w]ith that elasticity in details which calls forth the admiration of the most 
discerning critic of our commonwealth, the Constitution left to successive 
Senates and to successive Presidents the problem and the privilege of 
determining under the stress of actual government the precise manner in which 
they were to make the treaties of the nation.56 
Indeed, as the next Section shows, the same pragmatism that led the 
Washington Administration to favor subsequent advice and consent in some 
circumstances also led it to favor prospective advice and consent in others. 
3. Prospective Advice and Consent in the Washington 
Administration 
The conventional story line of the Washington Administration and 
treatymaking is the one given in the prior Subsection: A tale of pragmatic 
abandonment of pre-negotiation consultation with the Senate in favor of 
seeking advice and consent only after treaties were finalized. But there is a 
 
 52. Among others, Andrew Jackson did so prior to negotiating a treaty with the Choctaw 
Indians, and James Polk did so prior to signing a treaty with Great Britain over the Oregon boundary. 
See Charles C. Tansill, The Treaty-Making Powers of the Senate, 18 AM. J. INT’L L.459, 473-77 (1924) 
(identifying other examples); see also DANGERFIELD, supra note 20, at 328-48 (identifying ten non-
Indian treaties in the nineteenth century where the President formally sought Senate input before or 
during the negotiations). For all these treaties, the President returned the treaty to the Senate for 
subsequent advice and consent as well. See id. 
 53. In 1816, the recently formed Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended against a 
resolution providing President Monroe with unsolicited suggestions for possible negotiations with Great 
Britain, since the Committee was concerned that it might interfere with the President’s ability to ably 
manage foreign affairs. See Tansill, supra note 52, at 471-72. As a matter of practice then and since, the 
executive branch frequently consults with key senators and their staff (especially on the Foreign 
Relations Committee) prior to or during treaty negotiations, see HENKIN, supra note 2, at 177-78, but 
that practice is not considered mandatory and cannot seriously be considered “advice” in a constitutional 
sense. 
 54. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 37 (1944) 
(emphasis omitted); cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 626 (2004) (“This deviation from original understanding 
became common practice and remains the practice today.”). 
 55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (emphasis omitted). 
 56. HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 2. 
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counter story as well, more muted and rarely remembered, of pragmatic 
abandonment of post-negotiation advice and consent in favor of prospective 
advice and consent. As with the other account, it begins with Indian treaties 
and, in this case, more specifically with amendments to Indian treaties. 
In 1790, for example, Washington received pre-negotiation advice and 
consent from the Senate to negotiate a treaty whereby the Cherokees would 
surrender more land to already encroaching white settlers, and the United States 
would provide the Cherokees with an annual payment of as much as one 
thousand dollars.
57
 The treaty was duly negotiated, and the Senate gave its post-
negotiation advice and consent in late 1791.
58
 Then, in January of 1792, 
Washington wrote to the Senate “request[ing] your advice, whether an 
additional article shall be made to the Cherokee treaty,” namely, whether the 
annual payment should be increased to $1500.
59
 The Senate then “Resolved, 
(two-thirds of the Senate concurring therein,) That they do advise” increasing 
the amount to $1500.
60
 Washington never returned to the Senate for post-
negotiation advice and consent with regard to this additional article.
61
 Instead, 
on February 17, 1792, he simply ratified the additional article, stating that he 
did so “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
62
 It is unclear why 
Washington did not resubmit the amendment to the Senate for another round of 
advice and consent. Whatever the reason, the amendment became valid without 
ever receiving post-negotiation advice and consent, and thus stands as a strong 
precedent that, as a matter of timing, the Senate’s advice and consent need not 
necessarily follow negotiation and signature.
63
 
Washington later took a similar approach to Jay’s Treaty, a much more 
 
 57. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (entry of Aug. 11, 1790). 
 58. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (entry of Nov. 10, 1791). 
 59. Id. at 98 (entry of Jan. 18, 1792). 
 60. Id. at 99 (entry of Jan. 20, 1792). 
 61. J. Reuben Clark, Jr., et al., Solicitor’s Opinion of August 5, 1911, in DEP’T OF STATE, 
LETTERING FOR SOLICITOR’S OPINIONS, PART 2, at 1, 27 (1911) (on file with author) [hereinafter Clark 
Opinion]. 
 62. Statement of Ratification Accompanying Additional Article to the July 2, 1791 Treaty 
with the Cherokee (Ratified Indian Treaty No. 18, Apr. 1792); see also Clark Opinion, supra note 61, at 
27 (noting further that the Senate did not meet in executive session between the article’s signing and 
proclamation). 
 63. Washington seems to have sought prospective advice and consent from the Senate for 
amendments to two other Indian treaties, and then, after these amendments were negotiated and signed, 
simply ratified them without resubmitting them to the Senate. One of the other two instances involved a 
secret article added to the treaty with the Creek Indians. Washington received prospective advice and 
consent from the Senate in relation to this article. He apparently did not send it back to the Senate for 
post-negotiation advice and consent and instead simply proclaimed that he was ratifying it “by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate.” See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (entry of Aug. 
4, 1790); Clark Opinion, supra note 61, at 24-26. The other instance involved a stipulation to provide 
the Iroquois with $1500 a year and was effectively an amendment to a treaty that had been negotiated 
under the Continental Congress and ratified following advice and consent under the Washington 
Administration. See Additional Article of April 23, 1792, to the Agreement with the Five Nations, 1 AM. 
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFF. 232 (Ratified Indian Treaty #19); S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 
116 (entry of Mar. 26, 1792); HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 39. In the first instance, the language of the 
Senate Executive Journal records the Senate giving its advice and consent but does not specify that it 
was by a two-thirds majority, see S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (entry of Aug. 4, 1790), 
while in the second instance the Senate “Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senate concurring therein,) That 
they advise and consent to the stipulation above recited,” S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 116 
(entry of Mar. 26, 1792). 
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controversial matter. The Federalists and anti-Federalists in the Senate had 
engaged in a bitter struggle over whether to give subsequent advice and consent 
to it. At last, the Senate did advise and consent to the treaty, but it conditioned 
this advice and consent on a change to one term of the treaty.
64
 Washington 
then faced the question of whether, assuming the British agreed to the change, 
he could simply ratify the treaty or instead would have to send it back to the 
Senate for advice and consent on the post-amendment version—thus effectively 
giving the anti-Federalists a second bite at the apple.
65
 He consulted his 
Cabinet, and its members advised that he need not do so.
66
 In a detailed 
memorandum, Secretary of State Edmund Randolph pointed out that the 
wording of the Senate’s resolution did not require resubmission and then went 
on to explain why he considered there to be no constitutional requirement of 
resubmission: 
It was possible, that some people might hesitate upon the constitutionality of 
the Senate leaving to the President alone, to see, that their condition was 
complied with. In answer to this it may be said, the Senate are to advise and 
consent that the President make the treaty: they are not to make the treaty 
themselves. When they advise and consent unconstitutionally [unconditionally], 
they rely on the integrity of the President, that he will not suffer any words to 
be inserted in the paper, or omitted from it. In this case they rely, that he will 
strictly follow their advice. If he ratifies without again consulting them, he 
undertakes for the accuracy with which that advice has been followed. If he 
ratifies what they did not agree to, their security consists of this; that the treaty 
will, for that cause, not be the supreme law of the Land; and it cannot be 
concealed from the world by any official forms, since he must set forth the 
whole truth of the case in the ratification . . . . Consequently the Senate may 
give their advice and consent without the very treaty, which is to be ratified 
being before them.67 
Randolph’s position carried the day. After the British agreed to the treaty 
amendment, Washington did not return to the Senate but simply went ahead 
with the exchange of ratifications.
68
 In doing so, he set a precedent that the 
Senate itself came to embrace—when Thomas Jefferson sought a “second 
advice and consent” after renegotiating a treaty in conformity with the Senate’s 
conditional advice and consent, the Senate indicated that its further advice and 
consent was unnecessary.
69
 The most recent use of this approach occurred in 
the 1970s, when the Senate conditioned its advice and consent to the Panama 
 
 64. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong., Special Sess. 186 (entry of June 24, 1795) (“Resolved, 
(two-thirds of the Senate concurring therein,) That they do consent to, and advise the President of the 
United States, to ratify the treaty . . . on condition that there be added to the said treaty an article, 
whereby it shall be agreed to suspend the operation of so much of the 12th article, as respects the trade 
which his said Majesty thereby consents may be carried on, between the United States and his islands in 
the West Indies . . . .”). 
 65. See HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 85 (discussing how Thomas Jefferson expressed the hope 
that Washington would resubmit the treaty and that the anti-Federalists would then prevail). 
 66. Id. at 83-85. 
 67. Edmund Randolph on the British Treaty, 1795, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 587, 591 (1907) 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added). Interestingly, Randolph did not raise the amendments to the 
Indian treaties as precedents. 
 68. HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 86-88. 
 69. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 397-98 (entry of Dec. 11, 1801); HAYDEN, supra 
note 42, at 123-24. 
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Canal Neutrality Treaty on the renegotiation of two provisions in the treaty.
70
 
As with the Indian treaties, Washington’s decision to ratify Jay’s Treaty 
without submitting the finalized version again to the Senate powerfully 
demonstrates that, as a matter of timing, prospective advice and consent is 
constitutional. While these instances involved amendments to already 
negotiated (and sometimes already ratified) treaties, the same logic would 
justify prospective advice and consent to entire treaties. Indeed, under the law 
of nations that developed in relation to the Senate’s practice of conditionally 
approving treaties, a proposed amendment to a negotiated but not ratified treaty 
amounted to the refusal of the treaty and an offer to negotiate an entirely new 
treaty.
71
 And even today, amendments to already ratified treaties are treated as 
requiring the same constitutional processes as new treaties.
72
 The Washington 
Administration precedents thus provide strong support for the proposition that 
the Treaty Clause does not dictate the timing of the Senate’s advice and 
consent. 
B. Specificity 
The precedents for prospective advice and consent in the Washington 
Administration involved issues of timing rather than specificity. In those cases, 
the Senate gave its advice and consent in advance of negotiation, but did so in 
specific terms that left essentially no negotiating discretion to the President. 
This fact mattered, at least to Edmund Randolph. In the memo quoted earlier in 
which he argued that Washington need not return the renegotiated Jay’s Treaty 
to the Senate for another round of advice and consent, he went on to consider 
whether “the Senate may now advise and consent to the general matter of a 
treaty which may not be formed for years to come.”
73
 He thought that such 
conduct would probably be unconstitutional, distinguishing it from the situation 
at hand because the precision of the Senate’s proposed amendment to Jay’s 
Treaty gave “certainty that the sense of the Senate will be expressed.”
74
 
In this Section, I address these concerns about specificity and show that, 
within broad limits, prospective advice and consent is constitutional, or at least 
as constitutional as are other commonly accepted practices. Once again, I begin 
with the text of the Constitution, which offers no bar to broad-brush advice and 
consent. I then argue that, despite Randolph’s concerns, such broad-brush 
advice and consent finds support in the international legal norms at the time of 
the Framing, which effectively required nations to delegate substantial power to 
their negotiators. Lastly and most importantly, as a matter of practice, 
delegation from Congress to the President has become the norm. This is true 
 
 70. See 124 CONG. REC. 7187-88 (1978) (recording the Senate’s vote to advise and consent to 
the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty conditional on two particular amendments to the text of that treaty). 
 71. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 537-38 (1905); see also Clark Opinion, supra note 
61, at 30-34. The practice of using treaty reservations rather than amendments that has since developed 
has largely negated the relevance of this rule. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, arts. 17, 19-23, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 72. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 178-79. 
 73. Edmund Randolph on the British Treaty, 1795, supra note 67, at 591. 
 74. Id. at 592. 
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not only in administrative law, but also in international law, where the 
President frequently enters into specific international agreements based on 
broadly phrased congressional acts or resolutions. If such generalized grants are 
permissible in the context of ordinary legislation, they should be at least as 
permissible under the flexibly worded Treaty Clause. Indeed, as an examination 
of a series of now-forgotten treaties reveals, the Senate has given prospective 
advice and consent in broad-brush strokes at least three times in the past. 
1. Text, Separation of Powers, and Ditch-Digging 
As a textual matter, the Treaty Clause leaves it to the President and the 
Senate to determine whether the Senate’s advice and consent shall be given 
with regard to broad objectives or exact treaty provisions. The phrase “advice 
and consent” does not require one or the other, and in practice the first Senate 
used this phrase flexibly, sometimes with regard to exact terms and sometimes 
at a higher level of generality.
75
 Similarly, the phrase does not require that 
“advice and consent” be given one treaty at a time or that the precise identity of 
the treating parties be before the Senate.
76
 Indeed, a close reading of the phrase 
“advice and consent” shows that it does not even modify “treaties” in the first 
place. The President is to “have power, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, to make treaties.” Thus, the “advice and consent” modifies the 
President’s “power” to enter into treaties, rather than the treaties themselves. 
The phrase does imply some meaningful check on the President—otherwise, it 
would be a nullity—but it does not require review of every specific treaty 
provision. 
So far, I have consciously avoided using the term “delegation” in favor of 
“specificity” in framing the constitutional question. “Delegation” is associated 
with the formal principle of separation of powers and usually more particularly 
with the extent to which legislative power can be transferred from Congress to 
the executive or sometimes judicial branches.
77
 One can look at the Senate’s 
role in treatymaking as an act of legislative power, in which case, as David 
Golove has suggested, the constitutionality of broad-brush prospective advice 
and consent must pass muster under the non-delegation doctrine.
78
 Later on in 
 
 75. For uses of this phrase regarding bottom lines in negotiations rather than precise terms, see 
S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (Aug. 24, 1789) (agreeing “to advise and consent” to using 
up to $20,000 in a treaty with the Creeks “if necessary”); S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 
(Aug. 11, 1790) (recording that the Senate “advise[d] and consent[ed]” to the President negotiating a 
new boundary with the Cherokees without specifying what that boundary would be and to his offering 
the Cherokees up to $1000 annually in compensation). 
 76. Multilateral treatymaking already depends on these points in practice, since a multilateral 
treaty is akin to a collection of bilateral treaties, and since the Senate often gives advice and consent to 
multilateral treaties without certainty as to which other countries will join these treaties. For example, 
the Senate advised and consented to the Charter of the United Nations at a time when many countries 
that would join eventually (such as Japan, with whom the United States was still at war) were not even 
signatories. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
274 (2003). 
 77. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a delegation 
challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the 
agency.”). 
 78. Golove, supra note 5, at 1798-99 n.20, 1871-76.  
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this Article, I argue that it does, but—at a more fundamental level—such an 
argument may be unnecessary. It is far from clear that the Senate is acting as a 
legislative body in treatymaking. During the debates over the Constitution’s 
ratification, the Senate was sometimes described as acting as an executive 
council for treatymaking purposes,
79
 and even today the Senate goes into 
“executive session” when considering treaties.
80
 Similarly, there is good reason 
to doubt that the structural concerns about the separation of powers, which 
underlie much of the non-delegation doctrine, apply to treatymaking. The 
Framers quite consciously departed from their usual emphasis on separation of 
powers in crafting the Treaty Clause, as suggested by the fact that the Clause 
appears in Article II, but the Supremacy Clause provides that treaties are the 
law of the land.
81
 When the Treaty Clause was attacked for improperly 
blending legislative and executive powers, Alexander Hamilton and others 
strongly defended this “intermixture” as appropriate in light of the special 
nature of treatymaking.
82
 
The Treaty Clause thus preserves the idea of checks in requiring both the 
President and a supermajority of the Senate to authorize treaties, but it does not 
clearly separate out their roles as executive or legislative. Unlike in legislating, 
the Senate stands to one side in treatymaking in comparison with the 
President—a Solicitor for the State Department once described their respective 
roles with the “homely observation” that there is a “vast difference between 
digging a ditch and advising and consenting to such a performance.”
83
 
Accordingly, the constitutional issue is best cast not in terms of a formal 
transfer of power from the Senate to the President, but rather in terms of 
identifying the minimum that the Senate must do to fulfill its own constitutional 
role. Within limits that I discuss later on, broad-brush advice and consent 
satisfies this minimum. 
2. The Doctrine of Obligatory Ratification 
Like the text of the Constitution, the practice of treatymaking at the time 
of the Framing suggests that the Senate can give its advice and consent to broad 
negotiating objectives rather than precise terms. At the time of the 
 
 79. E.g., 2 RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 39, at 459-61 (recording the 
debates at the Pennsylvania Convention about whether treatymaking was legislative or executive, where 
James Wilson asserted that “[t]he President and the Council in this Constitution makes the treaty 
ministerially”); 6 RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 39, at 1326 (recounting that a 
delegate to the Massachusetts Convention referred to the Senate acting in its executive capacity for 
treatymaking). 
 80. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, R. XXIX, at 38 (2000); id., R. 
XXX, at 39. 
 81. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 31, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton) (further arguing that 
“if we attend carefully to [the Treaty Clause’s] operation it will be found to partake more of the 
legislative than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of 
either of them”); 2 RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 39, at 561-62 (recording 
Wilson’s responses at the Pennsylvania Convention to claims that the Treaty Clause blended powers). 
For other primary sources on whether treatymaking was executive, legislative, or a blend, see those 
collected by Rakove, supra note 35, at 263-67, and Golove, supra note 5, at 1871-76. 
 83. Clark Opinion, supra note 61, at 19. 
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Constitutional Convention, international law effectively required nations to 
delegate substantial power to their ministers in the course of treatymaking. 
More specifically, nations had an obligation to ratify treaties negotiated by their 
ministers, provided that these ministers had full powers to negotiate the treaties 
and the treaties’ terms fell within the scope of the private instructions that the 
sovereigns had given these ministers. As explained by Emer de Vattel in his 
widely regarded eighteenth-century treatise, 
the rights of the [minister] are determined by the instructions that are given 
him: he must not deviate from them; but every promise he makes in the terms 
of his commission, and within the extent of his powers, is binding on his 
constituent. 
. . .[B]efore a prince can honorably refuse to ratify a compact made in virtue of 
such plenipotentiary commission, he should be able to allege strong and 
substantial reasons, and, in particular, to prove that his minister has deviated 
from his instructions.84 
Like all principles of international law, this doctrine was not always 
scrupulously honored, but it cast a powerful shadow on the practice. 
The Continental Congress had practiced treatymaking in accordance with 
this doctrine, which smoothed the course of treatymaking over long distances. 
It would privately give its chosen plenipotentiaries instructions about 
negotiating objectives, often casting these in broad terms. Following the 
practice of the times, it would also give them public commissions containing 
language like the following: 
whatsoever shall be agreed and concluded for us and in our name. . . [shall 
have] the same effect as if we were personally present and acted therein: herein 
promising, in good faith, that we will accept, ratify, fulfil [sic] and execute 
whatever shall be agreed, concluded and signed by our ministers 
plenipotentiary.
85
 
In reviewing signed treaties sent to Congress for ratification, congressional 
committees would focus on whether these treaties fell within the scope of the 
instructions. By way of example, in reviewing a treaty of amity and commerce 
negotiated by John Adams with the Netherlands, a committee consisting of 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and Oliver Ellsworth concluded that “on 
a comparison of the [treaty] with the instructions given to [Adams], on that 
 
 84. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 339-40 (Bela Kapossy & Richard Whatmore 
eds., 2008) (1758); see also, e.g., J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE 66-73 (1946) (surveying practice and theory from the 
time and finding that Vattel’s position represented the general view in both); 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 
A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-93 (1906) (including excerpts on the issue from other scholars 
at the time); cf. Theodor Meron, The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 15-16 (1995) (discussing full powers in the context of medieval treaties). For discussion of 
Vattel’s influence in the late eighteenth century, including among the Framers, see, for example, Duncan 
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 774 (2010). 
 85. 20 JCC, supra note 27, at 654 (entry of June 15, 1781) (commission for a peace treaty with 
Great Britain). For additional examples, see, for example, 23 JCC, supra note 27, at 621-22 (entry of 
Sept. 28, 1782); 15 JCC, supra note 27, at 1235 (entry of Nov. 1, 1779); cf. JONES, supra note 84, at 11-
12, 18 (discussing the standard inclusion of such clauses in European full powers in the eighteenth 
century). The Continental Congress sometimes sought to retain an additional check on its negotiators by 
instructing them to consult with it before signing treaties, but it came to recognize the practical 
difficulties of this approach. See CRANDALL, supra note 46, at 24-25, 30-31. 
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subject they find that no variations have taken place which affect the substance 
of the plan proposed by Congress” and recommended its ratification.
86
 The 
only signed treaty that the Continental Congress sent back for renegotiation 
rather than ratifying—a consular treaty with France negotiated by Benjamin 
Franklin—was one that John Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, considered 
to be outside the scope of Franklin’s instructions, thus giving the Continental 
Congress a “Right to refuse the Ratification in Question.”
87
 
This doctrine received little specific attention during the Constitution’s 
drafting and ratification,
88
 but its influence is easily seen in the Senate’s early 
practice. In reviewing the first treaty presented to it for “advice and consent”—
the consular treaty with France as renegotiated by Jefferson following 
instructions from the Continental Congress—the Senate unanimously gave 
advice and consent after consulting with Jay and receiving his opinion that, 
even though the treaty was not particularly desirable, the United States was 
obligated as a matter of good faith to ratify it.
89
 The Senate viewed itself as 
effectively bound by the actions of the U.S. negotiators where those negotiators 
had acted in accordance with the instructions given to them. Indeed, that fact 
 
 86. 24 JCC, supra note 27, at 65 (entry of Jan 23, 1783). Even where the Continental Congress 
had concerns about a treaty, as long as that treaty fell materially within the instructions, it would ratify 
the treaty and then seek amendments of the terms. See CRANDALL, supra note 46, at 24-25 (discussing 
how Congress ratified a commercial treaty with France but requested amendments that would remove 
one U.S. concession and one French concession); id. at 33-34 (discussing how Congress ratified a 
commercial treaty with Sweden but requested that Benjamin Franklin seek amendments making 
typographic changes). 
 87. 29 JCC, supra note 27, at 500-15 (entry of July 6, 1785) (containing Jay’s report of July 4, 
1785). In his report to the Continental Congress, Jay explained that there were only two reasons a 
sovereign could refuse to ratify a treaty, namely: “either that their Ministers have exceeded the Powers 
delegated to them by their Commission, or departed from the Instructions given them to limit and 
regulate the Exercise and use of those Powers.” Id. at 508. 
 88. I have seen only a few references to this doctrine during the Convention and in the 
ratifying conventions. At the Convention, delegates Gorham and Johnson drew implicitly on this 
doctrine in arguing against a proposal to give the House a role in treaty ratification. RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 392-93.  During the ratification debates, similar proposals 
were made but ultimately failed. E.g., 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 843, 969, 
1152 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) (describing some unsuccessful attempts). Another clear reference 
occurred during the Virginia Convention, where anti-Federalist James Monroe noted in passing that 
“[t]he instruction is the foundation of the treaty; for if it is formed agreeable thereto, good faith requires 
that it be ratified. The practice of Congress hath also been always, I believe, in conformity to this idea.” 
10 RATIFICATION DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 39, at 1232; see also id. at 1236 (recording 
another delegate’s observation that failure to ratify a properly negotiated treaty is a cause for war). An 
interest in honoring the doctrine of obligatory ratification would have been consistent with the Framers’ 
strong interest in having the United States appear respectable in the eyes of other states. See David M. 
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of 
Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 935 (2010) (arguing that 
“[t]he fundamental purpose of the Federal Constitution was to create a nation-state that the European 
powers would recognize, in the practical and legal sense, as a ‘civilized state’ worthy of equal respect in 
the international community”). 
 89. HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 4-10; see also id. at 13 (discussing how a Senate committee 
considering Indian treaties that had been negotiated under instructions from the Continental Congress 
similarly focused on whether these treaties fell within the negotiators’ instructions). Some commentators 
have suggested that in his message to the Senate accompanying these Indian treaties George Washington 
urged a move away from the doctrine of obligatory ratification. See JONES, supra note 84, at 74; Swaine, 
supra note 22, at 1185-86 & nn.208-09. It seems more likely, however, that Washington simply wanted 
these Indian treaties reviewed to ensure that they complied with the negotiators’ instructions in the same 
way done with European treaties. Prior to that point Indian treaties had been deemed complete upon 
signature without the need for any ratification. See Rakove, supra note 35, at 266 n.47. 
 
268 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37: 247 
 
caused Edmund Randolph to believe that Jay’s Treaty could not be negotiated 
constitutionally without prior advice and consent from the Senate. He argued to 
Washington that failing to consult the Senate on the negotiating instructions 
would unconstitutionally “abridge the power of the senate to judge of [the 
treaty’s] merits,” since the doctrine of obligatory ratification would force the 
Senate to accept the treaty post-negotiation.
90
 Randolph was quickly proved 
wrong. Faced with a choice between the doctrine of obligatory ratification and 
playing a meaningful role, the Senate unhesitatingly chose the latter, and its 
amendment to Jay’s Treaty helped bring about the end of the doctrine in 
international law.
91
 
The doctrine of obligatory ratification suggests that, at the time of the 
Framing, the Senate’s role in crafting the often-broad negotiating instructions 
mattered more than its role as a post-negotiation reviewer. Broadly phrased 
prospective advice and consent thus likely comes closer to satisfying the 
Framers’ original vision of the Senate’s role than does the present scheme of 
subsequent advice and consent. 
3. Broad Mandates in Practice 
However specific the Senate’s advice and consent was meant to be at the 
time of the Framing, the last hundred years of U.S. legal history has seen the 
explosion of delegation in both administrative and international law—an 
explosion that should bury concerns about specificity and make clear that the 
Senate can constitutionally give its advice and consent in broad-brush strokes. 
In administrative law, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the de facto 
delegation of legislative power from Congress to the executive branch, 
provided that Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle 
to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”
92
 
 
 90. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (May 6, 1794), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw4/105/0800/0808.jpg (explaining further that “according to the 
rules of good faith, a treaty, which is stipulated to be ratified, ought to be so, unless the conduct of the 
minister be disavowed and punished”); see also 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 
24, at 424-25 (recording Framer Rufus King making a similar argument some years later in the Senate). 
The full powers given to Jay, however, did not promise ratification but observed that Jay was to transmit 
the treaty to the President “for his final ratification, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 1 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 471 (1833). Randolph did not approve of this approach, observing that if Jay “be 
permitted to sign a treaty of commerce, no form of attestation can be devised to be inserted in it which 
will not be tantamount to a stipulation to ratify, or leave the matter as much at large as if he had no such 
power.” Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, supra. 
 91. The British did not object to this amendment, and when they tried to object to similar 
practices down the road, the United States would simply cite the amendment to Jay’s Treaty as a 
precedent. See HAYDEN, supra note 42, at 150. In a treaty negotiated with Spain over the cessation of 
Florida, the United States went even further: Secretary of State John Quincy Adams asserted with 
admirable chutzpah that, on the one hand, the King of Spain was violating the doctrine of obligatory 
ratification when he hesitated to ratify the negotiated treaty, while, on the other hand, the United States’ 
precedent and constitutional structure made the doctrine inapplicable to the United States. 5 MOORE, 
supra note 84, at 188-91 (also quoting statements by President Monroe). The United States could not 
long maintain this double-edged approach, however, and over the nineteenth century the legal power of 
the doctrine waned in Europe as well. See JONES, supra note 84, at 12-15. 
 92. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (second alteration in original)). While Whitman pays lip 
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Congress can authorize the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission) to set “just and reasonable rates,”
93
 the 
Federal Communications Commission to regulate radio communications as 
required by “public interest, convenience, or necessity,”
94
 and the EPA to set 
“ambient air quality standards . . . [that] protect the public health.”
95
 In the 
context of treaties passed under the Treaty Clause, the Senate has sometimes 
surrendered power to the executive branch as well, such as when the treaty 
creates a venue for action in which the President but not the Senate plays a role 
(e.g., the Security Council of the United Nations) or when the treaty itself 
authorizes further international agreements that require the assent of the 
President but not the Senate.
96
 The implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Treaty, for example, gave rise to thousands of such 
agreements.
97
 As a formal matter, these authorizations are not prospective 
advice and consent, since the Senate’s release of control comes from the use of 
broad authorizing language in the text of negotiated treaties. As a practical 
matter, however, if the Senate can constitutionally cede control over details to 
the President through the use of broad language in treaties, then it is difficult to 
understand why the Treaty Clause would not also permit the Senate to cede 
control over details to the President through prospective advice and consent. 
Indeed, Congress has already done something similar to prospective 
advice and consent in the making of international agreements outside the 
Treaty Clause. Today, the vast majority of international agreements entered 
into by the United States are ex ante congressional-executive agreements, or 
international agreements entered into under the authority of prior congressional 
 
service to the non-delegation doctrine and thus does not describe the intelligible-principle standard as a 
delegation, in practice, this standard amounts to a delegation. See, e.g., id. at 488-89 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 731, 756 (2010). 
 93. See Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944). 
 94. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). 
 95. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472. 
 96. There is a further constitutional issue of the extent to which the United States can delegate 
authority to other international actors by treaty without reserving a certain veto. See generally Curtis A. 
Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1557 (2003) (arguing that federalism concerns and problems raised by domestic delegations of 
power between branches are also relevant to understanding international delegations); Kristina 
Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 MD. L. REV. 707 (2007) (calling for 
more precise analysis of different institutional frameworks for international delegations to identify and 
isolate those that pose greater constitutional problems). Since this is not an issue of the allocation of 
authority between the Senate and the President, I do not discuss it further. 
 97. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 86 n.116; cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) 
(upholding President’s authority to enter into an agreement related to armed forces pursuant to a security 
treaty with Japan); Hannah Chang, International Executive Agreements on Climate Change, 35 COLUM. 
J. ENVTL. L. 337, 361-62 (2010) (discussing such agreements in the aviation context); Donna Coleman 
Gregg, Lessons Learned from the Spectrum Wars, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 377, 412 (2009) 
(discussing how, in 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee instructed the executive branch to 
consider certain telecommunications agreements to be executive agreements made pursuant to an earlier 
treaty rather than separate treaties requiring Senate approval). The Senate has, on occasion, resisted 
treaties that authorize the President to enter into further agreements, perhaps most notably with regard to 
certain arbitral treaties negotiated early in the twentieth century. See W. STULL HOLT, TREATIES 
DEFEATED BY THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND SENATE OVER THE 
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 204-11 (1933). 
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statutes. The constitutional footing of these agreements (and of their cousins ex 
post congressional-executive agreements, where congressional approval is 
given after an agreement is negotiated), is somewhat murky in theory but well-
established in practice.
98
 In 1792, as part of an act establishing post offices, 
Congress authorized the Postmaster General to arrange with his counterparts in 
other countries for reciprocal mail delivery.
99
 As Oona Hathaway has 
painstakingly documented, over time this modest precedent blossomed, with an 
immense expansion beginning during the New Deal, until today around eighty 
percent of U.S. international agreements are made pursuant to ex ante 
congressional authorizations.
100
 The authorizing statutes typically specify the 
purpose of the agreements and sometimes identify criteria for selecting the 
partner nations, but they also leave broad discretion to the executive branch.
101
 
For example, a statute emphasizing the importance of international cooperation 
to control the drug trade simply provides that “the President is authorized to 
conclude agreements, including reciprocal maritime agreements, with other 
countries to facilitate control of the production, processing, transportation, and 
distribution of narcotics analgesics.”
102
 While the Supreme Court has never 
ruled on the constitutionality of ex ante congressional-executive agreements in 
relation to the non-delegation doctrine, in Field v. Clark it rejected a delegation 
challenge in the related context of Congress’s ability to authorize the President 
to suspend the application of a trade act against countries he deemed 
protectionist.
103
 
The prevalence of ex ante congressional-executive agreements serves 
both as a strong precedent for the constitutionality of broad-brush prospective 
advice and consent and as a likely reason why prospective advice and consent 
has not developed in practice. As a constitutional matter, if Congress can 
authorize congressional-executive agreements by broad-brush statutes that give 
 
 98. The sources cited supra note 5 cover these issues extensively. See also Rosalind Dixon, 
Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319 (describing this development as an example of 
informal constitutional updating). According to the Restatement, congressional-executive agreements 
are interchangeable with treaties. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 303(2) cmt. It is likely, however, that international agreements that exceed the 
enumerated powers of Congress or the President must be done through the Treaty Clause. See Missouri 
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (holding that a treaty made under the Treaty Clause could address 
subjects outside the reach of Congress’s powers). For more minor agreements, at least, some classic 
constitutional footing for congressional-executive agreements can be found based on the Constitution’s 
distinction between “agreements” and “compacts” on the one hand and “treaties” on the other in the 
context of powers prohibited to the states. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; see also Golove, supra note 5, at 
1810 (noting how this distinction supports the constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements); 
Hollis, supra note 84, at 773-79 (discussing possible interpretations of this distinction). 
 99. An Act to establish the Post-Office and Post Roads within the United States, ch. 7 § 26, 1 
Stat. 232, 239 (1792). 
 100. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 145, 167-205. For an argument using rational choice models 
to explain why congressional-executive agreements are used under certain circumstances and treaties 
under others, see John K. Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratification 
Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S5 (2002); John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and 
International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 101. See Hathaway, supra note 10, at 157-67 (identifying many examples and discussing 
common features). 
 102. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(2) (2006). 
 103. 143 U.S. 649, 680-94 (1892). 
 
2012] Prospective Advice and Consent 271 
  
the President significant discretion in setting the terms of these agreements and 
identifying the negotiating partners, then the Senate should be able to do the 
same under the flexibly worded Treaty Clause. As a practical matter, however, 
the rise of ex ante congressional-executive agreements may have reduced the 
need for the President and the Senate to consider the option of prospective 
advice and consent—even though, as I discuss in Part II, they are a worse 
solution in many respects. Because the political branches could and did use ex 
ante congressional-executive agreements to deal with the increasing demands 
of twentieth-century globalism, there was less pressure to search for a 
mechanism for meeting these same demands via the Treaty Clause. 
Although broad-brush prospective advice and consent did not take off in 
the twentieth century, it did have some fascinating near misses and at least 
three applications. In August of 1911, J. Reuben Clark, the Solicitor of the 
State Department, issued a thirty-five page opinion arguing that broad-brush 
prospective advice and consent would be constitutional.
104
 This opinion 
asserted that “Senatorial ‘advise and consent’ may be given to a general treaty 
plan and that the President conforming to such plan in his negotiation of a 
treaty, such treaty may be legally proclaimed by him” without returning to the 
Senate.
105
 This opinion did not give rise to prospective advice and consent in 
practice, but it did seed the ground for the issue to return another day. It was 
later excerpted at length in the Digest of International Law prepared by Green 
Hackworth, the Legal Advisor at the Department of State before and during 
World War II,
106
 and these excerpts in turn sparked the Senate’s debate over 
prospective advice and consent during consideration of the Connally 
Resolution.
107
 
Although Senators expressed skepticism at the concept of prospective 
advice and consent during the debates over the Connally Resolution, in practice 
the Senate had already given broad-brush prospective advice and consent to a 
series of minor treaties with Mexico in the preceding two decades. In 1924, a 
treaty entered into force between the United States and Mexico that provided 
that certain claims of U.S. citizens against Mexico and of Mexican citizens 
against the United States would be submitted to and resolved by either a 
General Claims Commission, which was to resolve all claims within three 
years, or a Special Claims Commission, which was to resolve all claims within 
five years.
108
 In February 1927, as the lifetime of the General Claims 
Commission was running out, the Senate passed a resolution authorizing the 
President to negotiate a treaty with Mexico that would extend this 
 
 104. Clark Opinion, supra note 61, at 1. This opinion addressed the specific question of 
whether the President could submit a treaty to the Senate where the treaty copy available for submission 
had been signed only by the American negotiator, but it went out of its way to defend broad-brush 
prospective advice and consent. See id. at 22-23, 27. 
 105. Clark Opinion, supra note 61, at 22; see also id. at 23, 27. 
 106. 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-60 (1943). 
 107. 89 CONG. REC. 8744, 8890, 8899, 8902, 9002 (1943). 
 108. For more details about these Commissions, see A.H. FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS 
COMMISSIONS 1923-1934, at 20-22, 56-69 (1935). 
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Commission’s existence.
109
 Based on this resolution, the President then 
negotiated and ratified such a treaty without returning to the Senate for 
subsequent advice and consent.
110
 Two years later, the Senate passed a 
resolution authorizing the President to negotiate yet another extension to this 
Commission, and also to negotiate an extension to the Special Claims 
Commission, and both such treaties were then negotiated and ratified without 
further Senate involvement.
111
A few years later, the Senate prospectively 
authorized yet another extension.
112
 Notably, rather than calling for any specific 
extensions, these Senate resolutions gave the President broad authority: they 
“requested” him “in his discretion, to negotiate and conclude with the Mexican 
Government such agreement as may be necessary and appropriate for the 
extension of the life of the . . . Claims Commission . . . and to make such 
further arrangement as in his judgment may be deemed appropriate for the 
expeditious adjudication of said claims.”
113
 
The treaties were minor ones, and the Senate passed its resolutions 
without any floor debate and indeed without using the phrase “advice and 
consent.”
114
 It is thus unsurprising that they have been overlooked—so much 
so, in fact, that despite his extraordinary knowledge of U.S. treaty history, 
David Golove has observed that “to [his] knowledge” the Senate has never 
 
 109. 68 CONG. REC. 4021 (1927) (showing that Senator Borah, the Chair of the Foreign 
Relations Committee and no internationalist, asked that the resolution be passed without floor debate). 
Hackworth’s Digest references this and one other of the extensions, and it suggests that the Senate's 
prospective advice and consent occurred so that the new treaties could be finalized during the Senate's 
recess. 5 HACKWORTH, supra note 106, at 58 (excerpting Department of State correspondence of June 
25, 1931). 
 110. 9 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 957 (1972) (describing a signature date of August 17, 1929 
and a ratification “by the President of the United States September 25, 1929, pursuant to Senate 
Resolution of May 25, 1929”). 
 111. 71 CONG. REC. 1899 (1929); 9 BEVANS, supra note 110, at 963, 965. On the basis of the 
single 1929 resolution, the President negotiated and ratified two separate treaties with Mexico, one 
dealing with the General Claims Commission and the other dealing with the Special Claims 
Commission. Id. at 963, 965. 
 112. 74 CONG. REC. 6410 (1931); see also 9 BEVANS, supra note 110, at 970 (recording that a 
treaty was subsequently negotiated and ratified under this authority without identifying any subsequent 
advice and consent). 
 113. 68 CONG. REC. 4021 (1927); see also 74 CONG. REC. 6410 (1931); 71 CONG. REC. 1899 
(1929). It could be argued that these agreements were done under the President’s independent power to 
arrange for the settlement of claims by U.S. citizens against foreign sovereigns. Whatever the contours 
of that power at the time, however, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International 
Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 19-38 (2003) (surveying the history of this 
power and noting its growth over time), I do not think the President was acting under it with regard to 
these agreements. To begin with, the original agreements setting up the Claims Commissions were done 
through the Treaty Clause, see 9 BEVANS, supra note 110, at 935, 941, and the same process would thus 
presumably have been applicable for amendment, see CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 178-79. In 
addition, had the President acted under his sole executive authority, he would not have needed to seek 
the Senate resolutions in the first place. Finally, Department of State correspondence from after two of 
the extensions and before the third treats these extensions as treaties effected through the Treaty Clause. 
See 5 HACKWORTH, supra note 106, at 58. 
 114. 74 CONG. REC. 6410 (1931); 71 CONG. REC. 1899 (1929); 68 CONG. REC. 4021 (1927). 
The executive branch treated these resolutions as functionally equivalent to “advice and consent,” 
however, see 9 BEVANS, supra note 110, at 957-70, and the Senate implicitly acquiesced in this 
treatment by granting the later renewals without having ever given subsequent advice and consent to the 
earlier ones. 
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given prospective advice and consent to a treaty.
115
 Nonetheless, they form a 
precedent the Senate can point to if it uses broad-brush prospective advice and 
consent in the future. 
4. Limits on Breadth 
It is hard to determine exactly when broad-brush advice and consent 
would be so general that it amounted to an unconstitutional abdication of the 
Senate’s treatymaking role. Obviously, the Senate could not pass a blanket 
resolution advising and consenting to all future treaties made by the President, 
but what if the Senate had in fact intended the Connally Resolution to 
constitute prospective “advice and consent” to what would become the Charter 
of the United Nations? In practice, there is little need to draw the line because 
the Senate will probably never come near it. While two-thirds of the Senate 
may be willing to trust the President with negotiating discretion, they are 
unlikely to write blank checks on matters of great importance. The debates over 
the Connally Resolution make this plain. The Senate that passed the Connally 
Resolution was deeply internationalist by today’s standards, yet not a single 
Senator expressed a wish for the Connally Resolution to constitute prospective 
advice and consent.
116
 
To the extent that constitutional line-drawing is desired, however, I 
propose two general principles to guide it. First, the Senate, the President, and 
(should it come to them) the courts should import the intelligible-principle 
doctrine from the legislative delegation context. This sensible doctrine allows 
for workable solutions while retaining some level of checks and balances, and 
its wealth of case law offers guidance as to the appropriate limits on 
generality.
117
 This doctrine is already relevant to the making of international 
agreements—as it arguably applies to congressional delegations for ex ante 
congressional-executive agreements—and it thus seems reasonable to similarly 
consider its use for prospective advice and consent. Second, as a matter of 
interpretation, the President and the courts should construe the discretion 
granted by the Senate narrowly rather than broadly. For example, drawing from 
canons of construction developed in the intelligible-principle context, the 
President should consider that the Senate, like Congress generally, does not 
“hide elephants in mouseholes.”
118
 Similarly, analogizing to the canon against 
implied repeal, the President should not treat prospective advice and consent as 
authorizing him to enter into treaty terms that conflict with existing laws unless 
 
 115. Golove, supra note 5, at 1798 n.20. 
 116. See generally 89 CONG. REC. 8610-9223 (1943) (encompassing the entire floor debate 
over the Connally Resolution). 
 117. Given the lessened concern for separation of powers in the context of the Treaty Clause, 
see supra Subsection II.B.1, and the President’s significant foreign affairs powers, see United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936), the Treaty Clause may well require less 
specificity from the Senate than Article I requires of Congress. Applying the intelligible-principle 
doctrine to the Treaty Clause thus may draw a line that is more conservative than the actual 
constitutional boundary. It is still a generous boundary, however, and so the benefits of familiarity that 
accompany the intelligible-principle doctrine seem to me to outweigh any gains that might come from 
trying to delineate a new, more permissive principle in the Treaty Clause context. 
 118. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
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the Senate specifically signals its approval to those kinds of terms.
119
 
In sum, as this Part has demonstrated, the Senate’s advice and consent can 
be given at any time and in broad strokes. Prospective advice and consent is 
textually permissible, as it is as consistent with the Framers’ intent as is the 
current practice of subsequent advice and consent, supported by strong if 
infrequent precedents under the Treaty Clause, and in harmony with Congress’s 
widely accepted delegations to the President in administrative and international 
law. 
III. MULTI-TREATY PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT 
As the previous Part explained, the Treaty Clause gives the political 
branches great flexibility as to when and how the Senate gives its advice and 
consent. Notably, however, this flexibility was exercised most in the decade 
immediately after the Founding. Even by the early nineteenth century, and 
certainly during the twentieth, with only rare exceptions, treatymaking under 
the Treaty Clause hewed to a path of negotiation and signature by the President 
or his agents, followed by Senate advice and consent, followed by the 
President’s ratification.
120
 All through the rise in multilateral treatymaking, the 
growth of the administrative state, and the explosion in international 
interconnectedness, the domestic process of treatymaking has remained largely 
the same. 
My argument in the remaining two Parts is that this stagnation has been 
costly, and that the use of prospective advice and consent would dramatically 
improve the treatymaking process. In this Part, I focus on prospective advice 
and consent as a way to facilitate making the many straightforward bilateral 
agreements that underlie ordinary international relations. International 
agreements requiring congressional authorization typically go through one of 
two processes: first, a handful each year are submitted for subsequent advice 
and consent under the Treaty Clause; and second, well over a hundred each 
year are entered into as ex ante congressional-executive agreements authorized 
by prior congressional legislation. Between them, these processes do succeed in 
generating routine international agreements, but they do so in ways that leave 
significant ground for improvement. Individualized subsequent advice and 
consent is overly cumbersome for routine bilateral treaties. Congressional 
authorizations for ex ante congressional-executive agreements have the 
opposite problem: they cede too much control to the President without leaving 
Congress with any meaningful supervisory control. Prospective advice and 
consent would be a valuable improvement on both processes. As discussed 
below, it would prove far more convenient than subsequent advice and consent, 
while at the same time allowing the Senate to retain far more supervisory 
 
 119. This approach would limit the possibility of conflict between existing legislation and treaty 
terms that only the President has specifically contemplated. Such conflicts currently arise where 
executive agreements ancillary to treaties conflict with domestic law, in which case, according to the 
Restatement (Third), the last-in-time rule applies. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. c (1987). 
 120. For the intricacies of this process, see CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 9-10. 
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authority than is the case with ex ante congressional-executive agreements. 
A. Prospective Advice and Consent for Repetitive Bilateral Treaties 
Treaties submitted to the Senate differ vastly in subject matter, number of 
treaty parties, and importance. Each year, the President typically sends between 
five and twenty-five treaties to the Senate, a number that far exceeds what the 
Framers imagined and yet has changed astonishingly little over the last 
century.
121
 In order to receive advice and consent, these treaties must be 
reported out favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and receive 
a successful floor vote that same session.
122
 Of these, around half are what I 
call repetitive bilateral treaties: bilateral treaties with similar terms entered into 
by the United States with many countries. Tax treaties are a good example. The 
United States enters into many similar bilateral tax treaties—it has even drawn 
up a Model Income Tax Convention
123
—and frequently updates these treaties 
to incorporate new policy objectives or harmonize their terms with changes in 
domestic law. Of the 104 treaties submitted to the Senate for advice and 
consent from 2001 through 2010, twenty-two were tax treaties aimed at 
eliminating the double taxation of income and preventing tax evasion.
124
 
Nineteen of those treaties simply amended or replaced existing tax treaties.
125
 
For example, in 2006, the Senate advised and consented to an amendment to a 
tax treaty with France that resolved several technical issues regarding pensions 
and investments made through partnerships;
126
 then in 2009 it advised and 
consented to yet another amendment that changed withholding rates for certain 
dividends, sought to reduce “treaty shopping” by tax-savvy entities, and 
 
 121. See Hathaway, supra note 10, at 180 fig. 1 (showing little change over the twentieth 
century); see also CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 39 (including tables showing similar results). From 
2001 through 2010, for example, the President submitted 104 treaties to the Senate that were assigned 
unique treaty numbers under the Senate’s classification system. Author’s calculations from LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, THOMAS: TREATIES (last visited Mar. 5, 2012), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/ 
treaties.html [hereinafter Thomas Database]. Sometimes multiple agreements are assigned the same 
treaty number and processed together by the Senate. The most striking instances in this decade were a 
mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty with the European Union, each of which was 
submitted together with over twenty bilateral agreements with individual European Union states on the 
same subjects. See Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement with the European Union, U.S.-EU, Sept. 28, 
2006, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-13; Extradition Agreement with the European Union, U.S.-EU, Sept. 28, 
2006, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-14. 
 122. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 7-8, 11-12. Treaties carry over in the Senate from session 
to session unless the Senate approves them or they are withdrawn in some fashion. If the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee reports a treaty to the whole Senate but the Senate does not hold a floor vote 
during that session, the treaty is returned again to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Id. 
 123. United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/international/article/0,,id=169597,00.html (replacing a 1996 
version). 
 124. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database and review of presidential transmission 
letters linked from this database. This time period included one other tax treaty as well: a treaty with 
France amending a prior estate tax treaty. See Protocol Amending Tax Convention on Inheritance with 
France, U.S.-Fr., Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-7 (2005). 
 125. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121, and review of presidential 
transmission letters linked from this database. 
 126. Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with France, U.S.-Fr., Sept. 28, 2005, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 109-4 (2005). 
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provided for mandatory arbitration of certain claims.
127
 Other examples of 
repetitive bilateral treaties from 2001 to 2010 include treaties with EU 
countries harmonizing existing bilateral investment treaties with EU law, 
extradition treaties, and mutual legal assistance treaties (also known as 
MLATs) providing for cooperation in certain criminal investigations, as to 
which the Senate advised and consented to eight, ten, and eleven respectively 
during this time period.
128
 
These repetitive bilateral treaties share several striking features. First, 
their content is indeed quite repetitive. The language of each individual treaty 
implements a broader policy, such as the goal of reducing double taxation of 
income, with modest country-specific variations.
129
 Second, the Senate almost 
always advises and consents to these treaties. Of the fifty-one tax, extradition, 
MLAT, and EU harmonizing treaties mentioned above, the Senate has advised 
and consented to forty-nine of them as of December 31, 2011, and the 
remaining two (which were submitted in November 2010) are awaiting floor 
votes.
130
 All of these treaties were approved by division votes, meaning that the 
Senate did not bother to hold a roll call.
131
 Third, the Senate rarely attaches 
reservations to these treaties, and it includes few understandings, declarations, 
or conditions affecting the treaties’ substance. Of the forty-nine treaties just 
mentioned, the Senate gave advice and consent to twenty-five without any 
further embellishments and fourteen more with simple declarations of self-
execution or of the supremacy of the Constitution.
132
 The remaining ten had 
additional declarations, understandings, or conditions of little significance.
133
 
 
 127. Protocol Amending Tax Convention with France, U.S.-Fr., Jan. 13, 2009, S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 111-4 (2009). 
 128. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121, and review of presidential 
transmission letters linked from this database. As is true throughout, I conservatively count treaties only 
if they are assigned a unique treaty number in the Senate. See supra note 121. (If all twenty-plus 
agreements submitted with the EU extradition treaty and with the EU MLAT were to be counted 
separately, the number of treaties in these categories would more than triple.) There are two instances 
where extradition treaties and MLATs were packaged together under a single treaty number, see 
Extradition Treaty with Romania and Protocol to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters with Romania, U.S.-Rom., Sept. 10, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110-11 (2008); Extradition 
Treaty with Bulgaria and an Agreement on Certain Aspects of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters with Bulgaria, U.S.-Bulg., Sept. 19, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110-12 (2008), and I have 
counted one instance as an extradition treaty and the other as an MLAT. These are not the only types of 
repetitive bilateral treaties, but they occurred with the greatest frequency during this time period. 
 129. For discussion of elements common to these treaties, see CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 
265-73, 278-85. Extradition treaties can have somewhat more variation. 
 130. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121. 
 131. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121. For background on the 
Senate’s voting processes, see MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 113-14 (2004). 
 132. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121, and from review of 
individual Senate resolutions where Thomas Database did not include the text of these resolutions. On 
very rare occasions, the Senate has sought to attach reservations to bilateral repetitive treaties. For 
example, in 1981 it advised and consented to a tax treaty with Argentina conditional on two 
reservations, and because of these reservations (and Argentina’s response to them) the treaty has not 
entered into force. Rocco V. Femia & Layla J. Aksakal, The Use of Tax Treaty Status in Legislation and 
the Impact on U.S. Tax Treaty Policy, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Apr. 26, 2010, at 342. 
 133. For four of these ten treaties, the Senate gave its advice and consent conditional on its 
receiving certain information or reports. Protocol Amending Tax Convention with France, supra note 
127; Protocol Amending 1980 Tax Convention with Canada, U.S.-Can., Sept. 21, 2007, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 110-15 (2008); Extradition Agreement with the European Union, U.S.-EU, June 25, 2003, S. 
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Rather than taking up these repetitive bilateral treaties one by one, the 
Senate should approve these treaties through resolutions of prospective advice 
and consent that will cover multiple treaties. The process would be 
straightforward: the Senate, presumably in consultation with the President, 
would pass a resolution giving advice and consent to all bilateral treaties on a 
certain subject that satisfied certain conditions. The Senate would control how 
specifically or generally it worded these resolutions, in line with the 
constitutional flexibility available to it. By way of example, the Senate could 
advise and consent in broad terms to tax treaties that relieved the double 
taxation of income for residents of the United States and the treaty partner, had 
protections against treaty-shopping, and provided for cooperation against 
suspected tax evaders, or it could instead draw from the specific language of 
the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention. The Senate could similarly use 
expansive or limited language in identifying appropriate treaty partners. For 
example, it might authorize tax treaties with all countries that the President 
determines to have met certain standards in terms of their tax codes and 
collection practices, or with countries with whom the United States already had 
tax treaties in force (thus giving prospective authorization only to replacements 
and amendments). The Senate could also include general declarations, 
understandings, or conditions in its resolutions, such as declarations of self-
execution or non-self-execution.
134
 In essence, the Senate would function 
similarly to how Congress does with ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements: It would work with the President to set policy objectives and then 
 
TREATY DOC. No. 109-14 (2006); Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Sri Lanka, U.S.-Sri Lanka, 
Sept. 20, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. No. 108-9 (2003). For four MLATs, the Senate included a condition 
that seems designed mainly to offend the U.S. treaty partners—namely, that the United States need not 
share information with officials in these countries if the CIA suspects the officials of drug-dealing; and 
for these treaties, as well as one extradition treaty, the Senate also included an understanding that these 
treaties would not be used to help the International Criminal Court. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, U.S.-Liech., July 8, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-16 (2002); Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, U.S.-India, Oct. 17, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-3 (2002); Extradition Treaty, 
U.S.-Peru, July 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-6 (2002); Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, U.S.-Ir., Jan. 18, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-9 (2002); Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, U.S.-Belize, Sept. 19, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-13 (2002). Finally, the Senate’s 
advice and consent to a replacement extradition treaty with the United Kingdom included several 
declarations, understandings, and provisos, mostly to ensure that the United Kingdom would not seek 
extraditions that would be in tension with the North Ireland peace process (a point that had already been 
confirmed through an exchange of notes among the respective executive branches). Extradition Treaty, 
U.S.-U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23 (2007). 
 134. Self-executing treaties double as judicially enforceable domestic laws, while non-self-
executing treaties are not judicially enforceable and, following Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), 
may not even have the status of domestic law. See, e.g., Ronald J. Bettauer, ABA Adopts ABA-ASIL Joint 
Task Force Policies on Implementing Treaties Under U.S. Law, 14 ASIL INSIGHT, May 6, 2010, 
available at http://www.asil.org/insights100506.cfm (discussing range of possible readings of Medellín). 
Medellín further indicates that a treaty must have “provisions clearly according it domestic effect” in 
order to be self-executing and emphasizes that both the President and the Senate must intend such 
domestic effect. 552 U.S. at 519, 526. In light of these factors, if the Senate intends a treaty or treaties to 
be self-executing, it should clearly signal this in its resolution of prospective advice and consent. See 
Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing 
Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 95-101 (2012). (Indeed, since Medellín, Senate 
resolutions of subsequent advice and consent now specify the Senate’s views on self-execution. See S. 
EXEC. REP. NO. 111-3, at 5 (2010) (noting this new policy)). The President can then ensure that 
language in the negotiated treaty clearly accords it domestic effect. 
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leave it to the executive branch to fill in the details.
135
 
That approach would have significant advantages across the board. At the 
most basic level, it would speed up the making of repetitive bilateral treaties. 
For the forty-nine treaties mentioned above, the Senate took an average of 
eleven months to give its advice and consent.
136
 That is a modest amount of 
time, but it carries real consequences in delaying the advantages that come with 
a treaty’s entry into force, such as improved tax policies or better transnational 
cooperation in criminal investigations, and it adds up alarmingly given how 
many treaties are held up in this way. By eliminating subsequent advice and 
consent for repetitive bilateral treaties and thus enabling ratification to follow 
fairly soon after signature, the United States would more quickly receive the 
benefits of these treaties. 
More importantly, the use of multi-treaty resolutions of prospective 
advice and consent would facilitate the making of more treaties. Individualized 
Senate advice and consent serves as an additional hurdle to treatymaking, and 
the Senate’s ability to review only a limited number of treaties each year
137
 
may deter the executive branch from making or amending treaties that would 
advance U.S. interests. To continue with the example of tax treaties, the United 
States has a much smaller network of tax treaties than does, for example, the 
United Kingdom,
138
 but it submitted only three new tax treaties to the Senate 
from 2001 to 2010. During that same period it submitted nineteen tax treaties 
that amended or replaced prior tax treaties in order to incorporate new policy 
objectives, such as making treaty-shopping harder, but it left dozens of other 
tax treaties unamended.
139
 Some of this may be due to policy reasons, to 
substantive disagreements with existing or potential treaty partners, or to the 
costs of negotiations, but surely some of it also reflects concern with 
overburdening the Senate. Similarly, there may well be useful types of treaties 
that the United States does not enter into (or enters into only rarely) because of 
the costs of obtaining individualized advice and consent. Although more such 
 
 135. The Senate Rule on treaties simply assumes that the final text of a treaty will be presented 
to the Senate and is silent on the issue of prospective advice and consent. See STANDING RULES OF THE 
SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, r. XXX, at 39-40 (2000). Accordingly, the Rules do not bar the Senate 
from passing a resolution of prospective advice and consent of its own initiative, cf. GOLD, supra note 
131, at 4 (suggesting that actions are permissible if there is an “absence of restrictive provisions” in the 
Rules), as was done in the 1920s with the arbitral treaties with Mexico. The Senate could also amend 
Rule XXX to set out procedures expressly for prospective advice and consent. Amendments to Rule 
XXX have happened in the past, most recently in 1986. See CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 118 n.6. 
 136. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database (showing that the median is around six 
months), supra note 121. This number is a proxy rather than a perfect reflection of the delays caused by 
the Senate process. Sometimes the delays will be greater, as where further time is lost while the 
executive branch prepares to submit the treaty to the Senate, and sometimes less, as when the ratification 
process of the treaty partner independently delays the treaty’s entry into force. 
 137. See CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 122-23 (noting the “time constraints” and observing 
that “[p]articular treaties may languish on the committee’s calendar, not necessarily because of serious 
opposition but for want of interested advocates with the time to do justice to them”); see also JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2005) (noting that “the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee can consider only a limited number of treaties each session” and that 
“[e]very treaty considered by the Senate thus comes at the cost of neglect of other treaties or laws that 
could further the president’s agenda”). 
 138. See Femia & Aksakal, supra note 132, at 341. 
 139. The United States presently is party to around sixty income tax treaties. See id. 
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treaties might benefit the United States, the hassle of getting Senate advice and 
consent may cause the executive to seek such treaties only with the most 
important treaty partners. By using prospective advice and consent, the United 
States could enter into more repetitive bilateral treaties that are minor 
individually but collectively amount to what Louis Henkin once called the 
“routine, undramatic, uncontroversial, ‘uninteresting’—I do not say 
unimportant—[foreign policy] aimed at achieving national ends usually 
through stability, order, good relations.”
140
 
By switching from individualized subsequent advice and consent to more 
generalized prospective advice and consent, the Senate would also gain a 
stronger role in setting the U.S. negotiating agenda for repetitive bilateral 
treaties. Presently, the Senate plays no official role in setting U.S. negotiating 
objectives. The Senate has long lamented this fact—a massive report prepared 
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calls this a “major problem”
141
—
and the Senate’s present treatment of bilateral repetitive treaties suggests that it 
does indeed care more about the general content of these treaties than about the 
specifics of any one treaty. Although repetitive bilateral treaties are subject to 
hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and occupy significant 
staff time, they receive little direct senatorial scrutiny: the hearings themselves 
tend to bundle several treaties together, be quite short, and be sparsely attended 
by actual Senators.
142
 Even when Senators have concerns about particular 
provisions of a treaty, they frequently seek resolution of those concerns not by 
requesting changes to the treaty but rather by urging the executive branch to 
rethink its approach for future treaties. For example, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee raised several specific concerns about the details of a 
mandatory arbitration provision in a tax treaty with Germany, but it did not 
seek to attach reservations, understandings, or declarations to this treaty and 
instead couched its concerns in terms of future treaties.
143
 Prospective advice 
 
 140. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 13 (2d ed. 1979). For 
purposes of this discussion, I assume that more treaties are desirable when the executive branch supports 
treaties and when difficulties processing them in the Senate relate less to their content than to the 
Senate’s method of processing. But even those wary of more repetitive bilateral agreements should see 
some value in prospective advice and consent since, as I suggest in the next Subsection, prospective 
advice and consent can provide more checks on treaties than do congressional authorizations for ex ante 
congressional-executive agreements. 
 141. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 15. For other examples of this longstanding complaint, see 
3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 424; and Bacon, supra note 23, at 511-12. 
Nevertheless, the executive branch often does consult with Senators and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in the course of treaty negotiations. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 142. For example, a hearing on November 10, 2009, covered five treaties (including three tax 
treaties), took forty minutes, and had only one Senator in attendance. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 111-3, 
Annex II, at 97-131 (2010). That same Senate Report reveals the degree to which individualized review 
of bilateral repetitive treaties, in this case a tax treaty with Malta, takes up time and resources on the part 
of both senatorial and executive staff. The 142 pages of the report and its annexes included detailed 
discussion by the Foreign Relations Committee, lengthy prepared statements by executive branch 
members, and further written exchanges on the record between Senators Kerry and Lugar and the 
Treasury Department. See generally id. 
 143. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-5, at 8-9 (2007) (suggesting, for example, that future treaties 
explicitly allow for more taxpayer input at the arbitrations); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 111-1, at 2 
(2009) (indicating that this point was incorporated into a later tax treaty with France). There are, of 
course, some instances where the Senate attaches conditions to a particular treaty, see supra note 133, 
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and consent would provide a much better forum for that kind of back-and-forth: 
the Senate would help craft broad treaty objectives from the beginning, and the 
Foreign Relations Committee could, if it chose, track the more minute details 
through the processes used by congressional committees in dealing with 
administrative agencies. 
Prospective advice and consent would carry few, if any, costs with it in 
relation to repetitive bilateral treaties. As a matter of international relations, it is 
unlikely that the executive branch gains material negotiating clout from the 
subsequent advice and consent process for repetitive bilateral treaties in light of 
the relatively minor individual nature of these treaties and the Senate’s nearly 
spotless if slow record of approving them. As a matter of Senate oversight, the 
Senate would, of course, be ceding some level of individual control in 
exchange for influence over policy direction and a process more compatible 
with transnational realities. But the Senate can retain substantial oversight over 
individual treaties, if it wishes. By incorporating additional checks into its 
resolution of prospective advice and consent—such as by obligating the 
reporting of any treaty authorized under this resolution to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (or other relevant committees) before its entry into force, 
including a sunset provision in this resolution, and, as I discuss at more length 
later in this Part, expressly reserving the effective right to withdraw its advice 
and consent prior to the ratification of any particular treaty—the Senate can 
ensure it has a voice.
144
 As a matter of legal certainty, questions might arise 
whether a particular treaty fell within the scope of the Senate’s prospective 
advice and consent, but the executive branch would have strong incentives not 
to risk pushing the boundaries. 
B. Prospective Advice and Consent Instead of Ex Ante Congressional-
Executive Agreements 
Until now, I have focused on prospective advice and consent for bilateral 
repetitive treaties as an alternative to subsequent advice and consent. But 
subsequent advice and consent is used for only a modest percentage of U.S. 
international agreements. Of the international agreements made with the 
involvement of the Senate or Congress,
145
 the vast majority are ex ante 
congressional-executive agreements. According to Oona Hathaway’s 
calculations, between 1980 and 2000 the United States entered into more than 
three thousand ex ante congressional-executive agreements, as compared to 375 
treaties made under the Treaty Clause (which I will also call Article II treaties) 
and a mere nine ex post congressional-executive agreements.
146
 I argue here 
that prospective advice and consent offers a valuable alternative to these 
 
but in my view these instances are ones where the United States would have been better served by less 
micro-management by the Senate. 
 144. Cf. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 244, 255 (making similar suggestions to the first two 
given here in the context of ex ante congressional-executive agreements). 
 145. There are two other processes for treatymaking, both of which have more limited scope: 
sole executive agreements and executive agreements ancillary to treaties made under the Treaty Clause. 
 146. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 150 n.16. 
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numerous ex ante congressional-executive agreements. 
Ex ante congressional-executive agreements hold obvious appeal to the 
President relative to subsequent advice and consent and to ex post 
congressional-executive agreements. Once Congress has passed its single 
authorizing statute on a particular subject, the executive branch can enter into 
many congressional-executive agreements based on that authorization without 
returning to Congress, unless the text of the authorization requires further 
congressional involvement.
147
 Its only remaining obligation to Congress, set by 
the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act, is to report these agreements to Congress within 
sixty days of their entry into force.
148
 By contrast, both subsequent advice and 
consent and ex post congressional-executive agreements involve individualized 
consideration of each negotiated agreement and accordingly take far more time 
and effort. Where an agreement falls within a prior congressional authorization, 
the executive branch is thus likely to rely only on this authorization rather than 
seek some form of post-negotiation approval. If there is no existing 
congressional authorization, then the State Department will submit the 
negotiated agreement either as an Article II treaty or as an ex post 
congressional-executive agreement based on a complicated calculus of factors, 
including the significance and duration of the agreement, past practice, and 
congressional preference.
149
 
That multi-faceted system of treatymaking has attracted considerable 
attention from academics in recent years, generating two main topics of debate: 
first, the constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements;
150
 and 
second, as a matter of practice, how treatymaking should be allocated among 
the various mechanisms. On the first issue, I will assume that congressional-
executive agreements are indeed constitutional—at least to the extent that they 
are presently used. I note that if they are instead unconstitutional (or cast 
sufficiently into doubt so as to reduce their use)—then the appeal of 
prospective advice and consent becomes even stronger. 
With regard to the second issue, Oona Hathaway has recently argued that 
ex ante congressional-executive agreements amount to a dangerous abdication 
of congressional authority.
151
 Specifically, she argues that ex ante 
 
 147. A handful of authorizing statutes do require more from the executive branch. See CRS 
REPORT, supra note 17, at 235-38. 
 148. See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (2006). 
 149. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 721, 723.3 (2006). This 
determination is part of what is known as the Circular 175 process. As the small number of ex post 
congressional-executive agreements relative to Article II treaties suggests, outside the trade context this 
usually means through the Article II treaty process. See Hathaway, supra note 10, at 150 n.16 (listing the 
nine ex post congressional-executive agreements found in her research covering 1980-2000, of which 
most related to trade). 
 150. See generally sources cited supra note 5. 
 151. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 145-47. As I discuss in more detail in Part III, Hathaway also 
argues that the Treaty Clause should gradually be abandoned in favor of ex post congressional-executive 
agreements. Hathaway, supra note 5, at 1352-55. Hathaway never explains why she considers the ex 
post congressional-executive process to be superior for bilateral repetitive treaties, however, and her 
arguments for switching have little relevance for these treaties. For example, she emphasizes the 
stiffness of the two-thirds requirement, see id. at 1307-37, but in the context of bilateral repetitive 
treaties, this requirement has not proven a barrier to treaty approval. The main problem with subsequent 
advice and consent for bilateral repetitive treaties is that their individualized consideration occupies time 
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congressional-executive agreements raise serious accountability questions: The 
President enters into well over a hundred each year based on broad prior 
congressional authorizations. But he need not report them to Congress under 
the Case-Zablocki Act until after their entry into force, and in any event, 
Congress has very limited ability to block them.
152
 Hathaway proposes 
amending the Case-Zablocki Act to require the President to report those 
agreements to Congress thirty or sixty days before they enter into force, as well 
as making them public where possible, in order to give Congress the chance to 
raise concerns.
153
 Her proposal is a valuable one, but it would not resolve many 
of the concerns she raises, because other than by passing a law, Congress has 
no formal ability to prevent the entry into force of any particular agreement that 
it finds questionable. 
In my view, prospective advice and consent could better resolve the 
problem Hathaway identifies. Prospective advice and consent offers 
considerable advantages over prior congressional authorizations. For one thing, 
the prospective advice and consent process may generate more careful 
consideration from the start. Congressional authorizations are often tucked into 
larger pieces of legislation and therefore less likely to receive specific scrutiny, 
while a resolution of prospective advice and consent would be solely aimed at 
authorizing a certain set of treaties.
154
 There would also be better oversight of 
the total amount of discretion made available to the President through these 
pre-authorizations. Hathaway postulates that Congress ceded so much authority 
to the President in part because no one kept track of the cumulative effect of 
numerous small delegations over decades.
155
 Although congressional 
authorizations for ex ante congressional-executive agreements may pass 
through quite varied congressional committees, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee would be a gatekeeper for all resolutions of prospective advice and 
consent. Finally, and most importantly, as I discuss in the next Section, the 
flexible nature of the Treaty Clause would enable the Senate to retain a “veto” 
over specific treaties in a way that is unavailable to Congress for ex ante 
congressional-executive agreements. 
I do not argue for always using prospective advice and consent instead of 
congressional authorizations in the future. Congressional authorizations may 
well be a superior method for certain types of agreements. Given the House’s 
role in appropriations, for example, international agreements requiring 
significant appropriations might be better authorized by congressional statutes 
than by prospective advice and consent. There may also be benefits to 
 
and effort on the part of the Senate while adding little value. Those problems would be increased, not 
decreased, by a switch to ex post congressional-executive agreements, which would require the 
agreement of both Houses in a single session. 
 152. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 191-205. 
 153. Id. at 244; see also CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 216, 236-37 (describing Senator 
Erwin’s attempts in the 1970s to get Congress to pass legislation that would have included a waiting 
period similar to what Hathaway is now proposing). 
 154. As noted previously, the Senate does not vote on treaties in conjunction with ordinary 
legislation and instead takes them up while in executive session. See supra note 80 and accompanying 
text. 
 155. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 185. 
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including congressional authorizations in broader statutes on certain occasions, 
as when an authorization is intimately bound into the overall statutory plan 
rather than a relatively discrete subpart. My argument is rather that 
interchangeability has advantages both ways. The demand for some kind of an 
ex ante process is clear from the hundreds of ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements made each year. Prospective advice and consent will sometimes 
fulfill this need in a better way than congressional authorizations, and the 
President and the Senate should consider using it accordingly. 
C. Preserving a Veto 
Prospective advice and consent offers one other major advantage over ex 
ante congressional-executive agreements: a way for the Senate to preserve a 
veto over particular treaties negotiated under its broad grant of authority. More 
specifically, I argue that the Senate can condition its prospective advice and 
consent on a requirement that the President submit each finalized treaty to the 
Senate for a certain period of time prior to its ratification and can retain the 
option of terminating its advice and consent to that treaty during this time 
period. This approach would allow the Senate to retain a powerful dose of 
control: the option to reject any particular treaty if it finds the terms or the 
identity of the treaty party objectionable.
156
 Once again, the Treaty Clause 
leaves the Senate with the flexibility to choose whether or not it wishes to take 
this approach in any particular circumstance. 
This approach was once possible for ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements as well. Some broad congressional authorizations required the 
President to submit congressional-executive agreements negotiated under them 
to Congress prior to entry into force so that Congress could have the option of 
vetoing them. For example, the Social Security Amendments of 1977, which 
authorize the President to enter into bilateral agreements to smooth the 
situations of people who have built up Social Security benefits in both the 
United States and other countries, provide that these agreements shall become 
effective no less than sixty days after their transmission to Congress and “that 
such [an] agreement shall not become effective if, during such period, either 
House of the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval of the agreement.”
157
 
Similarly, when designing the fast-track trade legislation in the 1970s, 
Congress considered allowing the President to enter into trade agreements 
subject to a one-house veto, although it ultimately decided to require a 
bicameral up-or-down vote to approve each trade agreement.
158
 
 
 156. Similarly, the Senate would probably be able to withdraw its entire generalized 
prospective advice and consent at any time, except with regard to treaties that have already been ratified. 
See infra note 166. 
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 433(e)(2) (2006); see also CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 238 (noting that this 
provision is now constitutionally problematic). 
 158. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 6 (1973) (providing that a trade agreement made under this 
bill would take effect if neither house passed a resolution disapproving the agreement within a 90-day 
window). But see S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 75-76 (1974) (noting the “constitutional problems which are 
raised by the House provision allowing a one-House veto of a change in domestic law negotiated by the 
President” and instead providing that a trade agreement must survive up-or-down votes in both houses 
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In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha, however, 
legislative vetoes are unconstitutional. Chadha considered whether, in an act 
delegating legislative authority to the executive branch, Congress could 
preserve the right to nullify any particular decision made by the executive 
branch in exercise of this authority by means of a one-house resolution.
159
 The 
Court held that this “convenient shortcut” was unconstitutional because it 
violated the requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
160
 As Justice White 
noted in dissent, this reasoning invalidated the legislative veto via concurrent 
resolutions as well as one-house ones, and for ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements as well as in the administrative law context.
161
 After Chadha, for 
Congress to stop a particular ex ante congressional-executive agreement from 
entering into force, it must either garner the President’s signature on a two-
house enactment or acquire a two-thirds majority in both houses sufficient to 
override his veto. Oona Hathaway thus concludes that Chadha “eliminated the 
single most significant control over ex ante congressional-executive agreements 
that Congress possessed.”
162
 
By contrast, the Senate can constitutionally retain the right to reconsider 
its advice and consent under the Treaty Clause prior to the President’s 
ratification of a treaty. The constitutional principles relied on in Chadha—
bicameralism and presentment—are inapplicable to the Treaty Clause. Indeed 
Chadha explicitly recognizes the Treaty Clause as one of four constitutional 
exceptions to these requirements.
163
 Moreover, unlike ordinary legislation, 
including statutes authorizing ex ante congressional-executive agreements, the 
Senate’s advice and consent has an inchoate quality: no law has been created 
through it until the President ratifies a treaty and it enters into force, so that the 
treaty therefore becomes the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy 
Clause. In giving its advice and consent under the Treaty Clause, the Senate is 
thus generally regarded as the master of its offer. It can condition ratification on 
the fulfillment of other requirements.
164
 For example, in giving its advice and 
consent to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
 
before becoming effective). 
 159. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923, 944 (1983). 
 160. Id. at 944-59. 
 161. See id. at 967, 1003-05 (White, J., dissenting) (listing congressional authorizations for ex 
ante congressional-executive agreements with both one-house and two-house legislative veto provisions 
as among those invalidated by Chadha). 
 162. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 194; see also id. at 196-204 (discussing Chadha and its 
effects on ex ante congressional-executive agreements in more detail). 
 163. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955-56. To the extent that Chadha further rests on the principle of 
separation of powers, this principle similarly carries less force for the Treaty Clause. See supra notes 77-
82 and accompanying text. The Senate’s practice of adding reservations when giving advice and consent 
also shows how different the advice and consent process is from ordinary legislation, as it effectively 
allows the Senate to give partial acceptance to a treaty. The President cannot constitutionally give partial 
consent to a piece of legislation, even where a framework statute of Congress has permitted him to do 
so. See generally Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the line-item veto). 
 164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
303 cmt. d (“But a condition having plausible relation to the treaty, or to its adoption or implementation, 
is presumably not improper, and if the President proceeds to make the treaty he is bound by the 
condition.”); id. reporter’s note 4; see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 375 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 406-10, 451-54 (2000). 
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Genocide (Genocide Convention), the Senate stipulated that the President could 
not deposit the instrument of ratification until after Congress had passed 
implementing legislation.
165
 
Just as the Senate can set conditions like these that must be met in order 
for ratification to occur, it should also be able to set conditions that would 
prevent ratification from occurring. It should be able to condition its advice and 
consent on the non-occurrence of a certain event—for example, the Senate 
could state that its prospective advice and consent is conditional on there being 
no Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings held on the treaty between the 
time of signature and ratification, or on there being no floor resolution 
disapproving the treaty during this time window. Alternatively, the Senate 
could specifically reserve the right to withdraw its advice and consent during 
the period prior to ratification.
166
 That approach might be less useful than the 
use of conditions, however, because it is an open question as to what voting 
margin the Senate would need to formally withdraw its advice and consent. 
Would it be the one-third-plus-one required to defeat advice and consent in the 
first place, the two-thirds required to obtain it, or some other ratio like a simple 
majority at the option of the Senate? If two-thirds of the Senate were needed to 
withdraw advice and consent, this would be a steep bar, although not nearly as 
steep as the two-thirds of both houses needed to override a presidential veto.
167
 
By crafting its resolutions of prospective advice and consent so as to 
leave it effectively with the option of a subsequent veto, the Senate could 
prevent the ratification of any repetitive bilateral treaties that it finds 
objectionable. Although, as I have shown above, the Senate finds very few 
bilateral repetitive treaties objectionable, it has done so occasionally. For 
 
 165. 132 CONG. REC. 2349-50 (1986); see also, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S7720-21 (daily ed. Sept. 
29, 2010) (approving defense treaty with Australia conditional on the President’s not exchanging notes 
of ratification until after he has submitted various reports and certifications to Congress); 143 CONG. 
REC. 8255-58 (1997) (approving multilateral defense treaty conditional on the President’s not depositing 
his instrument of ratification until he has made a certain certification to the Senate and further requiring 
that if he ever wishes to substantively amend the treaty he must submit the entire treaty (not just the 
amendment) again to the Senate for advice and consent). The Senate sometimes even conditions its 
advice and consent on the President’s taking certain steps after ratification, such as reports, 
certifications, or consultations with the Senate. E.g., 156 CONG. REC. S10982-85 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 
2010) (approving New START Treaty conditional on the President’s fulfilling significant reporting and 
consultation requirements after ratification). 
 166. Indeed, even if it does not explicitly reserve the right, the Senate probably has an inherent 
right to withdraw its advice and consent to a treaty at any time prior to ratification. In the related 
Appointments Clause context, on numerous occasions the Senate has successfully withdrawn its advice 
and consent to nominations prior to the issuance of the appointees' commissions. See United States v. 
Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 43-45 (1932) (holding that the Senate could not withdraw its advice and consent after 
a commission had issued, but carefully not reaching whether the Senate could withdraw advice and 
consent where it communicated this withdrawal prior to the issuance of a commission). I am not aware 
of any instances in which the Senate has sought to withdraw its advice and consent to a treaty prior to 
the treaty’s ratification. Edmund Randolph, at least, thought it could do so. Edmund Randolph on the 
British Treaty, 1795, supra note 67, at 592 (“[I]f before [the President] had passed his judgment upon [a 
treaty], a future Senate should by a vote of two thirds annul the preceding vote, it would be 
constitutionally abolished.”). 
 167. Moreover, in practice the President would likely decline to ratify any treaty where the 
Senate had previously triggered its withdrawal mechanism, as this would not only destroy working 
relations between the Senate and the President but also bind the United States to an international 
obligation whose domestic constitutionality was very much in doubt. 
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example, the Senate effectively rejected a tax treaty with Argentina in 1981 
through the attachment of reservations.
168
 The option of a Senate veto also 
would cast a shadow of constraint on executive branch action, making it vested 
in keeping the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on board so as to reduce 
the risk of a veto. In effect, prospective advice and consent with the option of a 
veto would preserve most of the control available to the Senate through its 
present process of individualized subsequent advice and consent while creating 
a much more workable system for treatymaking. 
IV. SINGLE-TREATY PROSPECTIVE ADVICE AND CONSENT 
Prospective advice and consent also offers great promise for major 
multilateral treaties, in a way quite different from that discussed in the previous 
Part. If prospective advice and consent for bilateral repetitive treaties provides a 
way for the Treaty Clause to accommodate the many small but valuable ties 
that bind countries together in today’s transnational world, then prospective 
advice and consent for major multilateral treaties addresses a different 
development: the increasing importance of such treaties in resolving issues of 
global concern. Prospective advice and consent offers a way for the United 
States to strengthen its hand in international negotiations and provides the 
Senate with incentives for acting in a timely and favorable manner. This Part 
describes the deep need for a better domestic process for the making of major 
multilateral treaties, argues that prospective advice and consent offers a 
solution, and provides examples as to how it might work in practice. 
A. Today’s Graveyard 
Over a hundred years ago, Secretary of State John Hay complained that 
“there would never be another Treaty, of any significance, ratified by the 
Senate.”
169
 There is some truth behind his hyperbole. While the Senate has 
since advised and consented to some treaties of surpassing importance, such as 
the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions, it has interred many others in its 
proverbial graveyard of treaties. A few treaties have been voted down outright, 
but many more have been laid to rest through endless delays and other means. 
This fact is not obvious from looking simply at the overall numbers. As 
Senate partisans point out, the “overwhelming majority of treaties receive 
favorable Senate action within a reasonable period of time.”
170
 Many of these 
treaties, however, are repetitive bilateral treaties of only modest significance. 
Similarly, one-of-a-kind treaties of only minor importance usually make it 
through the Senate without much trouble. To give a few examples, in the last 
decade the Senate has advised and consented to a treaty with Canada limiting 
tuna fishing, to a protocol to the Geneva Conventions giving the Red Crystal 
 
 168. See Femia & Aksakal, supra note 132, at 342 n.5 (noting that Senate reservations led to 
the non-adoption of this treaty). 
 169. Letter from John Hay to Henry Adams (Aug. 5, 1899), quoted in HOLT, supra note 97, at 
177. 
 170. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 117. 
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the same status as a symbol as the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and to a 
multilateral treaty establishing a registry for the rental of high-value aircraft.
171
 
As the treaties increase in significance, however, their clearance rates drop off 
sharply. Some major treaties do make it through, usually weakened by 
reservations, understandings, or declarations (collectively “RUDs”).
172
 But the 
most important one-of-a-kind treaties—particularly multilateral ones—tend 
simply to pile up, occasionally clearing the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee only to be returned to it at the end of the session for lack of a floor 
vote. At the beginning of 2012, for example, the Senate had thirty treaties left 
before it, with many of them going back decades, the oldest of which was 
submitted to the Senate in 1949.
173
 These include the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (submitted in 1971), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (submitted in 1980), 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (submitted in 1987), the Law of the Sea 
Convention (submitted in 1994), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(submitted in 1997), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (submitted in 2002).
174
 It is not a matter of the Senate picking and 
choosing which significant treaties to bring to a vote—rather, in recent history 
at least, the Senate simply does not vote on potentially controversial 
multilateral treaties. Of all the treaties voted on by the Senate from 2001 to 
2010, only one treaty—the bilateral New START Treaty with Russia—is 
recorded as receiving any dissenting votes.
175
 
The Senate’s failure to advise and consent to important multilateral 
treaties has significantly influenced the process of forming these international 
agreements at both a domestic and international level. At a domestic level, it 
has led the executive branch to bypass the Article II process on certain issues. 
The President now enters into some agreements under his own authority, such 
 
 171. Protocol III to 1949 Geneva Convention and an Amendment and Protocol to 1980 
Conventional Weapons Convention, June 20, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-10A (2006); Protocol to 
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft 
Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10 (2003); Exchange of Notes Constituting an 
Agreement Amending the Treaty on Pacific Coast Albacore Tuna Vessels and Port Privileges, U.S.-
Can., Aug. 21, 2002-Sept. 10, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-1 (2003). 
 172. Recent examples include an arms control treaty with the United Kingdom, Treaty with 
United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-U.K., Sept. 20, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 110-7 (2007), which received advice and consent three years after submission in a way that 
undermined the plain intent of the treaty by declaring it non-self-executing; and the Hague Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property, Jan. 6, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-1(A) (1999), which 
received advice and consent almost ten years after submission but was cabined through Senate 
understandings and a declaration of partial non-self-execution. 
 173. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121 and Treaties Pending in the 
Senate, supra note 3. The Senate also occasionally returns treaties to the President without having voted 
on them. E.g., S. Res. 267, 106th Cong. (2000) (returning seventeen treaties). 
 174. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121, and Treaties Pending in the 
Senate, supra note 3. Of these treaties, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is exceptional in 
having once received a floor vote, albeit a negative one. 145 CONG. REC. 25, 143 (1999) (recording 
forty-eight yeas and fifty-one nays). 
 175. Author’s calculations from Thomas Database, supra note 121. A division vote was used 
for most treaties and on the rare occasions where a roll call was taken, the votes were unanimous. Id. In 
the 1990s, treaties did occasionally receive dissenting votes—the Chemical Weapons Convention, for 
example, passed by a 74-26 vote. 143 CONG. REC. 6426-27 (1997). 
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as the Paris Peace Accords ending the Vietnam War, which would likely have 
gone to the Senate under the Framers’ original vision.
176
 The President also 
submits some important agreements as ex post congressional-executive 
agreements rather than as treaties, with the two most prominent recent 
examples being NAFTA and the establishment of the WTO.
177
 To date, 
however, both processes have proven limited in their scopes (whether due to 
constitutional limits or political constraints), and neither has become a 
complete substitute for the Article II process. 
At an international level, the Senate’s failure to give advice and consent 
to major multilateral treaties affects the President’s negotiating power. To 
understand why, it is useful to draw on Robert Putnam’s well-known portrayal 
of international negotiations as a two-level game, where each national leader is 
simultaneously trying to reach a favorable outcome in the international 
negotiations and to ensure the necessary support for this outcome back home.
178
 
Strong domestic constraints on a leader can have conflicting effects in the 
international game. On the one hand, that leader may have a bargaining 
advantage because he can argue that certain terms will simply not be acceptable 
back home, but on the other hand he will have low credibility if other leaders 
think he is likely to suffer involuntary defection—rejection back home—even if 
they agree to his terms.
179
 Putnam considers the subsequent advice and consent 
process to be a powerful example of the double-edged role of domestic 
constraints: it “increases the bargaining power of American negotiators, but it 
also reduces the scope for international cooperation . . . . [By] rais[ing] the odds 
for involuntary defection and mak[ing] potential partners warier about dealing 
with the Americans.”
180
 
Putnam does not parse out how his analysis might apply to different types 
of treaty negotiations. In my view, however, the trade-offs stemming from 
domestic constraints are likely to play out differently depending on whether or 
not all negotiating parties must ratify a treaty in order for it to enter into force. 
For bilateral treaties (and for multilateral treaties that require U.S. ratification 
in order for the treaty to enter into force
181
), the President does not lose much 
bargaining power due to his risk of involuntary defection. The other negotiators 
 
 176. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 88, 247 (giving other examples). 
 177. See Charnovitz, supra note 5, at 696-97. 
 178. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427, 433-34 (1988). 
 179. Id. at 439-41; see also LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES 
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 175-82 (2000) (arguing that Denmark’s high constitutional 
threshold for ceding power to the European Union has served as a domestic constraint that enables 
Denmark to be a particularly effective negotiator within the European Union). But see Peter B. Evans, 
Conclusions, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 
399, 402 (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993) (questioning whether 
negotiators with tied hands domestically do in fact do better in international negotiations). I assume for 
purposes of discussion that domestic constraints do help negotiators, but in any event my focus is less on 
the usefulness of constraints (which can arise through either prospective or subsequent advice and 
consent) and more on the effects of the risk of involuntary defection. 
 180. Putnam, supra note 178, at 448. 
 181. See, e.g., Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, art. 14 & Annex II, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 
I.L.M. 1439 (including the United States in a list of forty-four countries that must ratify the treaty before 
it enters into force). 
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should prefer any agreement that meets their minimum requirements to no 
agreement, so they should be willing to accommodate his asserted domestic 
constraints as long as these constraints are within their win sets. If the Senate 
fails to advise and consent to the treaty, then the treaty will simply not enter 
into force, and the parties will be in exactly the same positions as before the 
negotiation, less transactional and reputational costs. 
But for multilateral treaties that will enter into force for those countries 
that ratify it after some but not all of their fellow countries have ratified it, the 
trade-offs are very different. Imagine, for example, that four countries negotiate 
a treaty that will enter into force for the ratifiers after three countries have 
ratified it. Suppose further that three countries then ratify, so the treaty enters 
into force as to them. If the fourth country negotiated hard and successfully for 
the treaty to take a certain form but then fails to ratify it, then the other three 
countries will have only losses from their concessions. They agreed to a treaty 
that differs from the presumably more desirable treaty they would have reached 
without the fourth country participating in the negotiations, and now they are 
bound to that treaty without getting the anticipated gain of the fourth party’s 
participation.
182
 Given that risk, parties in such negotiations should be 
particularly wary of making substantial concessions to one party where that 
party seems a likely candidate for involuntary defection. The Senate’s history 
of failing to approve important multilateral treaties makes the United States 
such a candidate.
183
 
Recent remarks by John Bellinger, a Legal Advisor to the State 
Department during the George W. Bush administration, confirm that the 
Senate’s failure to advise and consent to treaties is reducing the effectiveness of 
U.S. negotiators. He explains: 
[T]his is a common refrain now that we hear from our negotiating partners, and 
it undermines the effectiveness of U.S. negotiators in trying to cut deals. If we 
say, “If we make this change, then we will come along,” then it's a little bit like 
the boy who cried wolf. It may well be that we will sign the treaty, but our 
negotiating partners have no confidence that the executive branch will 
necessarily be able to get a potentially controversial treaty through the Senate. 
That does undermine the negotiating effectiveness of our State Department and 
other negotiators.184 
The Senate’s failure to process important treaties has not escaped 
 
 182. Given the small number of countries in this hypothetical, renegotiation might be feasible. 
For multilateral treaties negotiated among many countries, however, the costs of renegotiation are 
tremendous. See CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 16 (noting that “renegotiation may not be feasible” for 
major multilateral treaties that are negotiated by many nations over years). 
 183. I do not mean to suggest that the only clout carried by U.S. negotiators comes from the 
possibility that the United States will ratify the treaty at issue. Other countries may seek to accommodate 
its negotiators for other reasons as well, such as hoping that the United States will sign the treaty even if 
it will not ratify it. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 18 (noting that 
states have an obligation not to defeat the object or purpose of a treaty they have signed). 
 184. Bellinger, supra note 4. During the 1998 Rome Conference where the treaty setting up the 
International Criminal Court was finalized, for example, “[t]here was eventually a limit to how much 
other states . . . would debilitate the court in order to satisfy a nation [the United States] that plainly was 
not going to join.” Jelena Pejic, The United States and the International Criminal Court: One Loophole 
Too Many, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 292 (2001). 
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academic attention. In light of it, Steve Charnovitz and Oona Hathaway have 
separately argued that treaties should be treated as ex post congressional-
executive agreements and that Congress should ensure them timely up-or-down 
votes in a way similar to that provided for under the now-expired fast-track 
process for trade agreements. This approach would make treatymaking easier in 
three main respects: first, simple majorities in both houses are likely easier to 
obtain than two-thirds of the Senate;
185
 second, a timely up-or-down vote 
would prevent delays and reservations; and third, to the extent that legislation is 
needed to implement the treaties, it could readily be passed simultaneously with 
the ex post approval.
186
 
Like Charnovitz and Hathaway, I think we need creative alternatives to 
the current morass, but I doubt the viability of their proposed solution. Even 
accepting that ex post congressional-executive agreements are constitutionally 
interchangeable with treaties—which is a contested issue—their proposal faces 
two tall hurdles. 
First, and most importantly, the Senate is likely to resist further shifts 
from the Article II process to ex post congressional-executive agreements. The 
Senate has long jealously guarded its constitutional prerogative in 
treatymaking. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Rules expressly note 
that “the House of Representatives has no role in the approval of treaties,”
187
 
and, as a report prepared for the Committee observes, “[a] perennial concern of 
Senators has been to insure that the most important international commitments 
are made as treaties . . . .”
188
As Bruce Ackerman and David Golove have 
shown, the Senate accepted a shift towards ex post congressional-executive 
agreements after World War II in the wake of enormous popular pressure;
189
 
however, outside of the trade context, the Senate has tolerated few 
encroachments since.
190
 Indeed, the Senate has reclaimed ground with regard to 
major arms control treaties. While the SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic 
Offensive Arms was approved ex post by a joint resolution in 1972, the Senate 
 
 185. Only simple majorities are constitutionally required for legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 7. The Senate’s current rule on cloture effectively bumps the margin up to three-fifths, see STANDING 
RULES OF THE SENATE, r. XXII, S. DOC. NO. 106-15 (2000), but Congress can override this rule through 
framework legislation such as that creating the fast-track process. 
 186. See Charnovitz, supra note 5, at 706-09; Hathaway, supra note 10, at 263-66; Hathaway, 
supra note 5, at 1354-56. Their positions are not identical. For example, Charnovitz calls for pre-
negotiation framework legislation that identifies U.S. negotiating objectives, Charnovitz, supra, at 707-
09, while Hathaway discusses framework legislation only in terms of ensuring an up-or-down vote, not 
in terms of setting negotiating objectives, Hathaway, supra note 10, at 263-66, and suggests that the 
President resubmit treaties presently pending before the Senate as ex post congressional-executive 
agreements, Hathaway, supra note 5, at 1354-55. 
 187. Rules of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, r. 9(a) (2009). 
 188. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 26; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987) (noting “the possibility that the Senate 
might refuse to consider a joint resolution of Congress to approve an agreement, insisting that the 
President submit the agreement as a treaty”). 
 189. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 5, at 861-96. 
 190. See Spiro, supra note 5, at 993-1003. I focus here only on important ex post congressional-
executive agreements. As Hathaway shows, ex ante congressional-executive agreements have become 
prevalent in many subject areas. See Hathaway, supra note 10, at 150-51 & n.16; Hathaway, supra note 
5, at 1260. 
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has since insisted that future major disarmament agreements be approved 
through the Article II process and has been effective in achieving this 
demand.
191
 Given the Senate’s resistance over the last sixty years to ex post 
congressional-executive agreements outside the trade context, it is hard to see 
why it would be willing now to embrace them and abandon the Treaty Clause. 
Second, while both Charnovitz and Hathaway point to the fast-track trade 
process as a model, its history offers cautionary notes as well as positive ones. 
The Trade Act of 2002 and its predecessors
192
 developed a collaborative and 
workable system for making international trade agreements. The Act identified 
objectives for the President to pursue in negotiations and required him to 
engage Congress in the negotiating process through substantial consultations 
with various congressional committees.
193
 If the President abided by the 
consultation requirements, then both houses would hold an up-or-down vote on 
the agreement and any implementing legislation within sixty days of its 
submission.
194
 This structured but streamlined approach facilitated the approval 
of important free trade agreements, including, under an earlier version of the 
Act, NAFTA, and the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
195
 On the cautionary 
side, however, Congress has recently been reluctant to extend fast-track 
authority. The 2002 Act, which passed by a thin margin of 215-212 in the 
House (although by a wider margin of 64-34 in the Senate), applied only to 
agreements entered into by July 1, 2007, and it has not been since renewed.
196
  
Given that fast track legislation is so contested in the trade context, it 
seems unlikely that Congress will pass similar legislation for international 
agreements generally or even for other specific categories of agreements, such 
as environmental agreements. In the absence of a fast-track process, however, 
the substitution of the ex post congressional-executive process for the Article II 
process would create further procedural hurdles for treaties. It would require 
treaties to make it on to two legislative calendars in a single session and give 
the House as well as the Senate a chance to attach RUDs, thus further 
triggering a likely conference committee stage and second round of votes to 
resolve differences. Given these practical difficulties, as well as the Senate’s 
oft-stated preference for the Treaty Clause for important agreements, it is 
important to look for alternatives to Charnovitz’s and Hathaway’s proposed 
approach. 
 
 191. Spiro, supra note 5, at 996-98 (noting that “[e]very arms control agreement since 1972 has 
been approved as a treaty” and discussing how the Senate leadership forced President Clinton to submit 
the CFE Flank Agreement as a treaty rather than an ex post congressional-executive agreement). 
 192. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002); see, e.g., Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974). 
 193. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-210, §§ 2102-2108, 116 Stat. 933, 994-1019. 
 194. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006). 
 195. Charnovitz, supra note 5, at 696-97 (identifying various agreements). 
 196. Laura Altieri, NAFTA and the FTAA: Regional Alternatives to Multilateralism, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 847, 854-56, 855 n.44, 862-65, 864 n.101 (2003); see also Karl Rowland, 
Obama’s Free Trade Goal Hits Roadblock: Democrats Give Him Little Help, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
2010, at A1, A10 (discussing free trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama that 
Congress had not yet approved). 
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B. Prospective Advice and Consent for Major Multilateral Treaties 
The United States is thus caught in a difficult feedback loop. The Senate 
is not advising and consenting to important multilateral treaties, which makes it 
less likely that U.S. negotiators can get desirable terms for future important 
multilateral treaties, which in turn makes it less likely that the Senate will 
approve these treaties. Prospective advice and consent offers at least a partial 
solution to this problem. Put simply, the Senate should give advice and consent 
to certain multilateral treaties in advance of their final negotiation, with the 
Senate’s resolution identifying certain minimum requirements that the treaty 
must satisfy in order for this advice and consent to take effect. The Senate 
would have the further option of retaining a “veto” in the ways described in 
Section II.C. As I discuss below, this approach would strengthen U.S. 
negotiating power, have appeal for the Senate, and be feasible to implement in 
practice. 
1. Improved Negotiating Power 
Prospective advice and consent would strengthen U.S. negotiating power. 
As discussed earlier, Putnam posits a trade-off arising from the subsequent 
advice and consent process: on the one hand, this process may increase the 
President’s bargaining power by making him a constrained negotiator, but on 
the other hand it may reduce other nations’ interest in accommodating him if 
they doubt his ability to deliver the Senate even if his terms are met.
197
 
Prospective advice and consent diminishes this trade-off: it retains the 
advantages of constraint while removing or at least reducing the risk of 
involuntary defection. 
Depending on how a resolution of prospective advice and consent were 
structured, it would provide either one or two forms of domestic constraints. 
First, a resolution of prospective advice and consent which did not reserve a 
post-negotiation veto for the Senate would set as constraints whatever 
minimum requirements were needed to satisfy its terms. U.S. negotiators could 
argue persuasively that these constraints are powerful ones: if the treaty did not 
satisfy the minimum requirements set out in the Senate’s resolution, then the 
executive branch would have to return to the Senate for subsequent advice and 
consent, with all the hazards that would imply. The constraints offered by such 
prospective advice and consent would of course differ from those imposed by a 
subsequent advice and consent process: prospective advice and consent would 
set clear, known, and fixed constraints, while the constraints imposed by 
subsequent advice and consent are unlikely to be fully known by any 
negotiators at the time of negotiations. Follow-up work to Putnam’s theory has 
suggested that either type of constraint can be effective, however,
198
 and so 
 
 197. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games 
with Uncertainty, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 403, 417 (1993) (arguing that a negotiator has an advantage 
where its severe domestic constraints are known in advance to all parties and also that where all 
negotiators have incomplete information about domestic constraints of a particular negotiator, that 
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prospective advice and consent would preserve the negotiating advantages that 
stem from tied hands. Second, a resolution of prospective advice and consent 
which reserved a post-negotiation veto for the Senate would set two types of 
constraints: the clear, known, and fixed requirements needed to satisfy the 
terms of this resolution in the first place, and the residual risk of the veto which 
U.S. negotiators could invoke in seeking to improve on the minimum terms set 
by the Senate. 
Prospective advice and consent would also greatly reduce the U.S. 
credibility problem. If the Senate resolution did not reserve a veto, this would 
demonstrate that the Senate was already on board if its terms were met. The 
United States would no longer be the “boy who cried wolf.”
199
 Instead, other 
negotiators could be confident that the risk of involuntary defection by the 
United States would be low where U.S. negotiators bargained for certain treaty 
terms and these terms fell within the conditions of the Senate's resolution of 
prospective advice and consent. If the Senate resolution did reserve a veto, then 
other negotiators would know that there remained some risk of U.S. defection. 
Unless the veto were extraordinarily easy to trigger, however, this risk would 
be less than under a subsequent advice and consent regime. 
A reserved veto by the Senate would have both advantages and 
disadvantages for U.S. negotiators. On the one hand, the possibility of the veto 
would make other negotiators more willing to agree to the U.S. position 
regarding terms left to the President’s discretion if they thought that these terms 
were necessary to prevent the exercise of the veto. On the other hand, the 
possibility of the veto would make other negotiators less willing to 
accommodate any U.S. terms if they thought that the Senate would end up 
exercising this veto even if its minimum conditions were met. The balance 
between these two positions would likely depend on what conditions the 
Senate’s resolution set for the exercise of this veto. If the Senate made the veto 
fairly hard to trigger—for example, by providing that its advice and consent 
was conditional on there being no Foreign Relations Committee Report or 
resolution passed on the Senate floor disapproving the treaty prior to 
ratification—then other negotiators would have strong although not complete 
confidence that the United States would join the treaty if its terms were met. 
They would also have good reason to accommodate U.S. terms left to the 
President’s discretion under the Senate’s resolution where the U.S. negotiators 
could show that these terms were important to keep the Senate from exercising 
its veto.
200
 In short, the flexibility available to the Senate in structuring its veto 
 
negotiator will retain a bargaining advantage if the probability of ratification is very responsive to the 
final terms); Ahmer Tarar, International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints, 45 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 320 (2001) (finding that negotiators with known and high domestic constraints can do 
better than other kinds of negotiators in certain situations where the other party is also constrained); see 
also Hathaway, supra note 10, at 235 (showing the difficulty in evaluating whether known or unknown 
constraints are more useful); cf. MARTIN, supra note 179, at 168 (arguing for the need for legislative 
involvement at the negotiation stage). 
 199. Bellinger, supra note 4. 
 200. One of the challenges with the subsequent advice and consent regime is that the seeming 
agreement of key Senate leaders during negotiations cannot now reliably guarantee Senate approval of a 
treaty or even a floor vote on the issue. The veto, by contrast, could be structured so that key Senate 
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would enable it to strike a case-by-case balance between showing the 
credibility of its commitment and retaining residual review. 
2. Appeal to the Senate 
Prospective advice and consent would not only advance U.S. interests, 
but also offer specific advantages to the Senate and its members. This is 
important and indeed essential, for prospective advice and consent is obviously 
not feasible without the support of two-thirds of the Senate.
201
 Those 
advantages, I suggest, can sometimes outweigh the importance of traditional 
review of the finalized treaty text and offer the hope of more votes that might 
be obtained through such a review. 
To begin with, prospective advice and consent gives the Senate a 
meaningful role at the negotiations stage. While the President may consult with 
Senators during negotiations, the Senate currently has no formal role at this 
stage. This absence rankles, particularly in relation to multilateral treaties. As a 
report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explains: “The 
Senate’s problem of not receiving a treaty until it is completed is particularly 
acute in multilateral treaties . . . negotiated by many nations in large 
conferences, sometimes over a period of years.”
202
 With prospective advice and 
consent, the Senate can play a strong role in setting the negotiating agenda of 
the United States, and the President will have a substantial interest in engaging 
with the Senate in order to obtain the benefits of prospective advice and 
consent. 
A meaningful Senate role at the negotiating stage may in turn help shield 
treaties from two longstanding causes of Senate resistance to treaties: “[first,] 
the struggle between the President and Senate for the control of foreign policy, 
[and second,] the warfare of the President’s political opponents who hope to 
secure some partisan advantage.”
203
 Subsequent advice and consent exacerbates 
both of these causes. It makes the relationship between the President and the 
Senate “adversar[ial] instead of collaborative”
204
 because it separates their roles 
into separate stages and thus encourages them to second-guess each other. It 
fosters partisanship for similar reasons. When Senators are presented with an 
already negotiated treaty, their role is mainly one of approving the President’s 
 
leaders can give credible assurances that it will not be exercised if their terms are met. 
 201. I focus here on the appeal to the Senate because the Senate is the body responsible for 
advice and consent. Prospective advice and consent should also appeal to the President, however, for 
reasons related to the ones I give here. Like the Senate, the President should value the increase in U.S. 
negotiating power that comes from prospective advice and consent. He should also prefer prospective 
advice and consent to the extent that it has greater appeal to Senators and thus is easier to obtain. 
Finally, prospective advice and consent spares the President the frustration and embarrassment of 
reaching a treaty after exhausting negotiations only to be stymied by the Senate’s failure to advise and 
consent to it—a problem that Theodore Roosevelt once colorfully described as “making diplomatic 
bricks without straw.” See Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, President, U.S., to Joseph Bucklin Bishop 
(Mar. 23, 1905), quoted in HOLT, supra note 97, at 222. On the other hand, however, the President 
would have to accept the increased involvement of the Senate at the negotiation stage and to share 
control in defining U.S. negotiating objectives. 
 202. CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 16. 
 203. HOLT, supra note 97, at v. 
 204. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 51 (1990). 
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policy, not of influencing it. Senators not of the President’s party thus face a 
nearly binary choice between giving or denying him a win—a choice likely to 
foster partisanship. By contrast, prospective advice and consent puts the Senate 
and the President together at the beginning. This creates greater scope for 
cross-branch and bipartisan collaboration, which in turn has three possible 
advantages in securing the necessary votes in the Senate, even assuming no 
effects on U.S. negotiating power. First, prospective advice and consent causes 
the President to determine pivotal Senators’ positions at a time when these 
determinations could potentially be accommodated into the treaty.
205
 Second, 
prospective advice and consent may give rise to more favorable positions on 
the part of Senators because it gives Senators not of the President’s party the 
chance to influence U.S. negotiating positions and thus to portray the resulting 
treaty as their own success. Third, Senators may in fact be more willing to 
delegate decisionmaking authority to the President than to accept a single, 
specific outcome.
206
 In short, while prospective advice and consent will not 
eliminate partisanship in treatymaking, it offers an incremental improvement 
over subsequent advice and consent. 
Prospective advice and consent should also appeal to the Senate to the 
extent that it offers the United States increased negotiating power. The 
credibility problems facing U.S. negotiators have not gone unnoticed in the 
Senate—as former Senator Chuck Hagel once observed, “[t]he credibility of 
the United States is not enhanced when the administration negotiates a treaty 
that has no hope of ratification in the U.S. Senate.”
207
 U.S. dominance on the 
world stage has perhaps shielded the United States from some effects of its loss 
of credibility in international negotiations, but this may be on the wane as 
Europe negotiates more effectively as a block
208
 and, in the recent words of one 
Republican legislator, “[the Chinese] plan on eating our lunch in this next 
century.”
209
 The increased negotiating power offered by prospective advice and 
consent in turn may bring in the votes of more Senators, not only because they 
wish to help strengthen U.S. interests but also because these strengthened 
interests may in turn be more appealing to them.
210
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 207. 143 CONG. REC. S81150 (daily ed. July 25, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chuck Hagel). 
 208. See, e.g., David Bosco, The Multilateralist, Are Europeans Better Negotiators?, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Aug. 24, 2010), http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/08/24/are_europeans_better_ 
negotiators/ (quoting a State Department official as observing that European negotiators coordinate well 
to have their interests “heavily represented” at major multilateral conferences). 
 209. Kate Sheppard, Departing Republican Attacks Climate Change Deniers in His Own Party, 
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/nov/19/ 
republican-climate-change-bob-inglis (quoting departing Representative Bob Inglis of South Carolina). 
 210. To the extent that the Senate does not want the treaty to enter into force as to the United 
States unless certain other countries are also bound by it, then it could condition its advice and consent 
on the President’s waiting to ratify the treaty until those other countries ratify it. Cf. Edward T. Swaine, 
Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2074 (2003) (discussing strategic considerations regarding the 
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The prospect of this increased negotiating power also offers the Senate an 
incentive to act rather than to delay. Some major multilateral treaties remain 
endlessly delayed in the Senate because they likely lack the two-thirds support 
needed to pass them, but for others the delay is more about the difficulty of 
receiving a floor vote. For example, the Law of the Sea Convention was 
reported unanimously out of the Senate Foreign Relations Convention in 2004, 
but it never received a floor vote.
211
 The difference between subsequent advice 
and consent in one session and subsequent advice and consent in the next 
session is often incremental, making treaties easy candidates for repeated 
postponements. By contrast, prospective advice and consent would likely 
prompt action by providing a genuine external deadline. If the Senate wishes to 
specify U.S. negotiating objectives and thereby increase U.S. negotiating 
power, then it must act before the final negotiating conference. Senators who 
favor the treaty thus will have more compelling arguments at their disposal for 
urging prompt action on a resolution. Conversely, Senators who wish to delay 
the treaty will likely have to spend more political capital to do so, as they may 
be accused of reducing U.S. negotiating power vis-à-vis other countries. An 
example of how deadlines can spur action can be seen in the Senate’s 
subsequent advice and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which 
occurred in response to an external deadline.
212
 
Finally, and most parochially, prospective advice and consent offers the 
Senate a way of protecting its prerogatives under the Treaty Clause. As 
discussed above, Oona Hathaway has called for the President to start 
submitting treaties as ex post congressional-executive agreements rather than 
through the Treaty Clause. To the extent that Senators care about control 
shifting from the Senate to Congress generally, they can use prospective advice 
and consent to dissuade the President from submitting treaties as ex post 
congressional-executive agreements. Prospective advice and consent would 
both offer the President more certainty of success in the Senate (since the treaty 
would only need to survive any residual review process written into the 
resolution of advice and consent) and make it harder for him to justify a 
decision to treat the agreement as an ex post congressional-executive 
agreement. At the moment, there is little reason to think that the President 
 
timing of ratification). 
 211. See SCOTT G. BORGERSON, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 12 (2009) 
(noting further that Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist did not schedule it for a floor vote); cf. Charnovitz, 
supra note 5, at 709 (arguing that at least in the trade context, automatic up-or-down votes matter more 
to successful passage than does a specific voting ratio requirement). Another example is the Genocide 
Convention, which cleared its floor vote with eighty-three yeas and eleven nays but did not receive this 
vote until thirty-seven years after its submission to the Senate. See LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 1-2 (1991). 
 212. See generally John V. Parachini, U.S. Senate Ratification of the CWC: Lessons for the 
CTBT, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1997, at 62. The entry-into-force date of the treaty at the 
international level provided a deadline that incentivized President Clinton to devote enormous energy 
towards its ratification. See id. at 66 (“The existence of a clear deadline was another factor that helped 
secure U.S. ratification of the CWC.”). This deadline was a soft one, in that the United States could still 
have joined the treaty at a later date, but there were symbolic and practical advantages to meeting it. 
Although the treaty was opposed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms, he 
permitted it to come to a vote in exchange for a significant side-deal. Id. at 67. 
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intends to increase the use of ex post congressional-executive agreements 
outside the already-established trade context. But if that changes, then 
prospective advice and consent offers the Senate a way to deter further 
encroachments. 
Whether these advantages will carry the day with the Senate will be a 
treaty-by-treaty matter. Just as Congress is willing to delegate legislative power 
to the President and administrative agencies on some but not all issues, so the 
Senate is likely to be more willing to give prospective advice and consent on 
some types of treaties and insist on retaining the subsequent advice and consent 
process for others. For example, the Senate may be more willing to give broad-
brush mandates to the President in areas where it thinks the executive branch 
has technical expertise, such as the law of the sea, but less willing where the 
issues are more obviously normative, such as human rights law. As another 
example, the Senate may be more likely to prefer a role at the negotiating stage 
for treaties that ban reservations, while it may continue to prefer a role at the 
reviewing stage for treaties that can accommodate substantial reservations.
213
 
Although, as I have shown in Part I, prospective advice and consent is not 
entirely new, it would be a substantial shift from the Senate’s ordinary practice. 
There is a range of ways in which the Senate could begin to use it. If it wished, 
it could give prospective advice and consent without further procedural 
conditions. In the alternative, it could make its advice and consent conditional 
on further procedural issues, such as by conditioning its resolution on a Senate 
presence on the U.S. negotiating team or a veto opportunity after negotiation 
but before ratification.
214
 If the Senate wished to reserve another check, its 
resolution of prospective advice and consent could provide that the treaty 
would be non-self-executing and require that the President not ratify the treaty 
until any necessary implementing legislation had been passed, which would in 
essence necessitate further congressional action before the treaty could take 
effect.
215
 There may well also be other ways to take prospective advice and 
consent cautiously.
216
 My point is not to argue for any particular variant, but 
 
 213. See CRS REPORT, supra note 17, at 16 (noting the Senate’s dislike of treaties that ban 
reservations, as “the Senate is called upon to take or leave [the treaty] in its entirety”). 
 214. See supra Section III.C. 
 215. Of course, the more hedges the Senate chooses to put on its prospective advice and 
consent, the less international negotiators may be convinced of the sustainability of the Senate’s 
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signal with no legal force may have such effect: during the debates over the UN Charter, for example, 
Senators repeatedly pointed to the Connally Resolution as having moved the Senate down the path 
towards advice and consent. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 7950 (1945) (statement of Sen. Connally); 91 
CONG. REC. 8008 (1945) (statement of Sen. Burton); 91 CONG. REC. 8033 (1945) (statement of Sen. 
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(statement of Sen. Brooks); see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 76, at 45 (noting that Cordell Hull (who 
was Secretary of State for much of World War II) viewed the Connally Resolution as opening the door 
for U.S. involvement in a U.N.-like body). 
 216. Alternatively, the Senate could also develop a process similar to the framework resolutions 
used by Congress in the trade context. For example, the Senate could modify its own Rules to ensure 
that certain types of treaties receive a fast-track up-or-down vote without reservations within a certain 
number of days of submission, provided that the President negotiates these treaties according to 
whatever terms were set out in the resolution (e.g., continuous consultation with the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee during negotiations). See Lehmann, supra note 6, at 896-97 (proposing a fast-track 
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rather that prospective advice and consent is a tool that the Senate can use with 
considerable flexibility. 
3. Feasibility 
A Senate resolution giving prospective advice and consent for an 
important multilateral treaty would need to be carefully calibrated to set 
negotiating minimums high enough to constitute wins for the United States but 
low enough that other countries might accept them. This would be a difficult 
task, but perhaps less difficult than it seems. 
A resolution of prospective advice and consent would bear some 
resemblance to the prospective instructions issued by the Continental Congress 
and the Senate during the first few years of the Washington Administration. 
These instructions set forth both strict requirements and space for discretion. 
For example, private instructions issued by the Continental Congress for 
perhaps the most important treaty in U.S. history—the peace treaty with Great 
Britain—identified independence and specific boundaries as firm requirements, 
explained that fishing rights in Canada were important though not absolutely 
essential, and stated that 
[i]n all matters not above mentioned, you are to govern yourselves by the 
Alliance between his Most Christian Majesty [France] and these States, by the 
advice of our allies, by your knowledge of our Interests, and by your own 
discretion, . . . in which we repose the fullest confidence.
217
 
As discussed earlier, in issuing these instructions, the Congress also committed 
itself to ratifying any treaty that comported with them, pursuant to the doctrine 
of obligatory ratification.
218
 
This early practice is not a perfect parallel for what I am suggesting. For 
one thing, the Continental Congress kept its instructions secret. Even if secrecy 
were desirable, however, I do not think it is feasible for prospective advice and 
consent today. The likelihood of leaks is simply too high. While some 
consultations can be kept secret, it seems unlikely that such secrecy could 
securely extend to the passage of a resolution by the entire Senate. If the 
resolutions of prospective advice and consent are public, then the Senate has 
two ways available to it to strengthen the hand of U.S. negotiators on 
contentious issues. One is to offer clear minimum requirements and to make 
 
process for arms control treaties). This would not be prospective advice and consent, as a subsequent 
vote would be required. In my view, however, prospective advice and consent is superior to this 
approach both for repetitive bilateral treaties and for major multilateral treaties. Repetitive bilateral 
treaties tend to be individually unimportant enough that general preclearance with a right of 
reconsideration makes more sense than setting up a framework statute that involves Senators in their 
negotiation and requires individualized consideration of finalized treaties. Major multilateral treaties, on 
the other hand, are often sufficiently unique that for a framework resolution approach to work for them, 
the framework resolutions would either have to be improbably broad in terms of subject matter or 
tailored specifically to each treaty—in which case, the treaty would need to make it through two votes 
rather than just one. 
 217. 14 JCC, supra note 27, at 956-60 (1779); see also 18 id. at 948-50 (1780) (modifying these 
instructions); 20 id. at 651-52 (1781) (modifying further the instructions and naming additional 
plenipotentiaries). 
 218. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
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them as favorable to the U.S. as seems feasible.
219
 Where the Continental 
Congress stated in its private instructions that fishing rights in Canada were 
desired but not required, the Senate in a comparable situation might want to 
take a stronger public position and require fishing rights. The other is to insist 
on the vigorous pursuit of certain objectives and reserve for the Senate the 
option of a post-negotiation veto. Continuing with the fishing rights example, 
the Senate could instead resolve that the President should make every effort to 
secure fishing rights and reserve for itself the option of revisiting its advice and 
consent after the treaty’s negotiation. This would signal to other countries that 
the President was a constrained actor on these objectives, even though the exact 
contours of the constraints would not be known to these countries. The 
President could then consult privately with Senators throughout the treaty 
negotiations to try to ensure that the terms reached were sufficiently favorable 
that they would not invoke their option of a veto. 
One other difference between the time of the Continental Congress and 
the present is that major multilateral treaties of today are much more 
complex—or at least much longer—than were the bilateral treaties of old. The 
Law of the Sea Convention, for example, contains 320 articles, many of them 
with subparts, and several annexes.
220
 Given this complexity, one might 
wonder whether the Senate could cover all relevant issues in a resolution of 
prospective advice and consent, and do so in a way that leaves a chance of the 
treaty being accepted at the international level. Two factors explain why the 
answer is yes. 
First, the likely contours of multilateral treaties are often clear well before 
their final negotiation. While in the past treaties often developed fairly 
quickly—the UN Charter, for example, was finalized in 1945 after only a year 
of serious preparatory rounds
221
—today’s multilateral treaties typically follow 
years of negotiations. On climate change, for example, serious negotiations 
commenced in 1989 and have been ongoing ever since, with peaks before the 
1992 Rio Summit (resulting in the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change), at Kyoto in 1997 (resulting in the Kyoto Protocol), and at 
Copenhagen in 2009 (not resulting in any treaty).
222
 Over the course of the 
preliminary rounds, the subject matters to be covered by the treaties come into 
focus, as do likely points of agreement and matters of continuing controversy. 
U.S. negotiators can share this knowledge with the Senate as it crafts its 
resolution of prospective advice and consent. I think it unlikely that the 
Senate’s resolution would occur at the beginning of the negotiation process, 
although the President might well start involving key Senators at or before this 
time. Rather, prospective advice and consent makes more sense towards the 
end of the international negotiation process, after key issues have come into 
 
 219. See Iida, supra note 198, at 417 (discussing how severe domestic constraints that are 
known to all negotiators can strengthen that country’s negotiators). 
 220. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S 397. 
 221. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 76, at 47-51 (describing the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 
1944 and suggesting that only the United States had done serious preparatory work prior to it). 
 222. See Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AM. J. 
INT’L LAW 230, 231-32 (2010). 
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focus at an international level. The Senate will thus have both this knowledge 
base to draw from and the necessary time for groundwork. It can accordingly 
frame its resolution of advice and consent to include both important points that 
the earlier negotiations have settled and to stake out its bottom line on the 
controversial issues that it chooses to prioritize. 
Second, within the bounds of the intelligible principle doctrine, the 
Senate can pick and choose how much specificity to offer on particular issues. 
The Continental Congress instructed its plenipotentiaries to try to preserve 
fishing rights in Canada—but it left it to them to specify that American 
fisherman would not be allowed to dry or cure fish on Newfoundland but 
would be allowed to do so along the unsettled bays of Nova Scotia.
223
 
Similarly, for many and perhaps sometimes for all issues in a treaty, the Senate 
can identify the policy objectives but leave the President with considerable 
room for negotiating the precise terms of their implementation. For the most 
important and controversial issues, the Senate can choose whether to offer very 
precise minimum requirements or to use a higher level of generality (perhaps 
paired with a post-ratification right of veto). Once again, the Senate can draw 
upon the expertise of the U.S. negotiating team in making those choices 
through closed hearings or some other form of communication. The negotiators 
are likely to have a good sense of what minimums are feasible, what issues 
require greater flexibility, and, among these issues, which the United States 
might wish to prioritize. 
I do not suggest that prospective advice and consent would always work. 
To the contrary, like much else in treatymaking, it would probably fail more 
often than not. The Senate might not agree on a resolution or, if it did, U.S. 
negotiators might not succeed in securing a treaty text that satisfies this 
resolution's terms. In either case, however, a failed try may be as good or better 
for U.S. interests than no try at all. If the Senate cannot produce a resolution of 
prospective advice and consent, this will only harm U.S. negotiating interests if 
it reduces the U.S. credibility below where it would have been had no attempt 
been made. But the United States could presumably argue that the resolution 
failed for reasons related to process rather than substance (such as the Senate’s 
difficulty in structuring prospective advice and consent or its preference for the 
more traditional subsequent advice and consent) and could point to its very 
attempt to secure the resolution as a sign of its commitment to the treaty under 
negotiation.
224
 Conversely, if the Senate produces a resolution to which the 
negotiated treaty does not conform, then the President would need to resubmit 
the treaty for subsequent advice and consent.
225
 But the prospective advice and 
 
 223. See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and his Britannic 
Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. III, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. 
 224. In addition, the President could work with key Senators to ensure that the resolution dies in 
a way least likely to harm U.S. negotiating interests. For example, if it becomes clear that the resolution 
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consent might still have helped advance U.S. negotiating positions. Moreover, 
under either scenario, Senators would have gained exposure to the core issues 
prior to the treaty’s negotiation and the executive branch would have learned 
more about which Senators it particularly needed to liaise with during the 
negotiations—both factors likely to make subsequent advice and consent easier 
to obtain.
226
 
C. Examples 
Up to now, I have described prospective advice and consent for major 
multilateral treaties at a high level of generality. In this Section, I offer brief 
examples of how prospective advice and consent might have worked in the past 
or might work in the future. I draw these examples from three very different 
areas of international law: the law of the sea, climate change, and trade. I have 
chosen these examples because they demonstrate the possibilities prospective 
advice and consent offers for major multilateral treaties across a wide range of 
subject areas. 
1. Law of the Sea 
In the second half of the twentieth century, one of the great questions of 
international law was how nations should share and divide rights to the oceans. 
Following several earlier attempts, the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea convened in 1973 to develop a treaty on the law of the sea, one 
that would cover territorial sea limits, exclusive economic zones, navigation 
rights, deep sea mining, and other issues. Over the next nine years, negotiators 
hammered out a comprehensive treaty, one that satisfied U.S. interests in part 
but not in whole. In particular, U.S. negotiators opposed the provisions on deep 
sea mining, which in the views of the United States inappropriately required 
sharing of technology by developed countries with developing ones and placed 
undue burdens on private companies, among other undesirable features.
227
 The 
 
would resemble what happened when a treaty negotiator exceeded instructions in the days when the 
principle of obligatory ratification was in force. In that situation, the sovereign had a right under the law 
of nations to reject the treaty, see supra note 84 and accompanying text, although the sovereign might 
nonetheless choose to ratify it. 
 226. One final issue of feasibility relates to the behavior of other countries.  What if they too 
were to get prospective advice and consent from their legislatures—and what if their prospective 
mandates left no shared ground with the Senate’s prospective mandate? Such an outcome would be 
unfortunate, but there is reason to think the United States would be allowed to be unique in using a 
prospective advice and consent approach given the Senate’s unparalleled reputation in international law 
as a stumbling block to treaty ratification. Because of this reputation, the international community is 
likely to accept prospective advice and consent as a genuine effort by the President and the Senate to 
promote the treaty at issue rather than simply as posturing. Such acceptance would be less forthcoming 
for countries other than the United States, as virtually all of them are either sufficiently nondemocratic 
that their legislatures are under their executives’ thumbs; parliamentary systems where the interests of 
the executive and legislature run together; or at the very least in need only of simple majorities rather 
than supermajorities for treaty approval. See Hathaway, supra note 5, at 1271-72; see also 
PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott eds., 1994) (illustrating the uniqueness of the U.S. 
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 227. See JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1982 
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United States would have had to accept this provision in order to join the treaty, 
since no reservations to it were permitted.
228
 Ultimately, in 1982 President 
Reagan declined to sign the Law of the Sea Convention due to the deep sea 
mining provisions, although he announced that the United States would abide 
by most of the Convention’s other substantive provisions.
229
 
Other developed countries shared the United States’ concern, and 
eventually the United Nations decided to reopen negotiations on the deep sea 
mining provisions. In 1994, negotiators reached an agreement that effectively 
amended these provisions to satisfy the concerns of the United States and other 
developed countries.
230
 President Clinton promptly signed this agreement and 
sent it and the original Law of the Sea Convention to the Senate for advice and 
consent in October 1994.
231
 To this day the treaty remains in the Senate, despite 
the support of the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations.
232
 
The delay seems less about the two-thirds requirement and more about political 
will. The treaty has twice been reported favorably out of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, once unanimously in 2004 and once by a 17-4 vote in 
2007, only to fail both times to receive a floor vote.
233
 The failure of the United 
States to ratify this treaty despite having won the concessions it sought is one of 
the reasons the United States has become “a bit like the boy who cried wolf” in 
terms of negotiating credibility in multilateral treaty formation.
234
 
Prospective advice and consent could potentially have furthered U.S. 
foreign policy interests during at least two points in this process. One was early 
in the Reagan administration, when agreements on most issues except deep sea 
mining had been reached. Here there was a chance, though a small one, that the 
certainty of a U.S. commitment to the treaty would have strengthened its 
negotiators and carried the day.
235
 A Senate resolution of prospective advice 
and consent could have advised and consented to the treaty conditional on it 
containing the key features that had already been negotiated as well as deep sea 
mining provisions that were conducive to private development, did not involve 
technology transfers, and were overseen by a board with adequate 
representation from the United States. The second likely point was during the 
renegotiation of the mining provisions, which occurred late in the George H.W. 
Bush Administration and early in the Clinton Administration. Either President 
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could have gone to the Senate for a resolution of prospective advice and 
consent similar to the one just described. In effect, this resolution would have 
resembled subsequent advice and consent conditional on particular 
amendments, as was done with Jay’s Treaty, except that the amendments would 
have been identified in terms of negotiating objectives rather than specific 
treaty language. 
The Senate would have had stronger incentives to give advice and 
consent prospectively to the Law of the Sea Convention than it has had to do so 
subsequently. It would have had a chance to collaborate with the President in 
setting the U.S. negotiating agenda, the possibility of boosting U.S. negotiating 
power, and specific deadlines in the form of the negotiating conferences to 
inspire it to action. Under either scenario, the Senate might have reserved the 
option of a “veto” prior to ratification, but the power of inertia would then have 
been on the side of ratification. Instead, the Law of the Sea Convention has met 
with more than seventeen years of delay in the Senate. 
2. Climate Change 
In 1992, President Bush signed and the Senate advised and consented 
with unusual swiftness to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).
236
 The UNFCCC identified the “common but 
differentiated” responsibilities of developed and developing countries and 
called for further negotiations rather than setting any legally binding 
requirements for emissions reduction.
237
 As negotiations continued, the parties 
appeared headed towards a treaty that set binding requirements only for 
developed countries, not for developing ones, to be finalized at a December 
1997 conference in Kyoto.
238
 Then, in July 1997, the Senate passed a resolution 
that was essentially the opposite of prospective advice and consent. Known as 
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, and emphatically not endorsed by the Clinton 
Administration, it expressed the sense of the Senate that the United States 
should not sign any treaties that committed the United States to limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions unless (1) developing countries also committed to 
limitations; and (2) the treaty would not “serious[ly] harm” the U.S. 
economy.
239
 The Byrd-Hagel Resolution passed 95-0.
240
 It left the United 
States in a tough negotiating position at Kyoto:
241
on the one hand, it was clear 
that the Senate would not advise and consent to any treaty that did not involve 
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developing country commitments, while on the other hand the Clinton 
Administration could offer little certainty that the United States would in fact 
join a treaty that did have developing country commitments. U.S. negotiators 
failed to get developing country commitments included in the Kyoto Protocol; 
and while President Clinton signed the Protocol in 1998, he “never dared” to 
send it to the Senate for advice and consent.
242
 
Instead of the negative Byrd-Hagel Resolution, suppose that the Senate 
had passed a positive resolution advising and consenting to a climate treaty that 
satisfied certain objectives—such as including commitments from developing 
countries, mandating emissions reductions to only a certain threshold, offering 
flexibility in implementation, and causing no serious harm to the U.S. 
economy—and further authorizing the President to ratify it only if countries 
amounting to a certain high percentage of the world’s population (e.g., 
including China or India) had also ratified it. This would have given the United 
States a significant boost in its attempt to obtain commitments from developing 
countries (as well as stronger support from developed countries in pursuing this 
goal), since the rest of the world would have placed a high value on obtaining a 
likely commitment from the United States, then the world's biggest emitter of 
carbon dioxide.
243
 At the domestic level, the Senate would have had incentives 
to give prospective advice and consent in order to increase U.S. negotiating 
power, particularly vis-à-vis China (about which the floor debates over the 
Byrd-Hagel Resolution revealed deep concern).
244
 The process would also have 
involved the Senate in a collaborative rather than adversarial way, with the 
increased potential for buy-in that this implies. As elsewhere, the Senate could 
have reserved a right to review the final treaty—an approach that would have 
weakened the strength of the Senate’s initial commitment but would have 
placed the subsequent burden on opponents of the treaty rather than on those in 
favor of it. 
Prospective advice and consent might well have failed in this example. 
But even then, the United States might well be in a better position to deal with 
climate change than it is today. Even if the resolution of prospective advice and 
consent did not gain enough support to be brought to a vote, it might have 
positively exposed Senators to the issue or reduced the degree of support for 
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. If a resolution of prospective advice and consent 
had passed but developing nations refused to accept emission-control 
commitments, then these countries would be more likely to be seen as the 
international obstructionists and accordingly face more pressure to change their 
approach. 
Climate change talks continue today under the UNFCCC framework. It is 
unlikely that sufficient support in the Senate can be found for any action in 
relation to climate change in the short to medium term. If the political climate 
changes in years to come, however, prospective advice and consent may offer 
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more potential for success than subsequent advice and consent. Through 
prospective advice and consent, the United States could gain negotiating 
leverage by setting out tough negotiating positions while simultaneously 
sending a credible signal that the United States is likely on board if these 
positions are met.
245
 This increased leverage in turn could give Senators an 
incentive to pursue prospective advice and consent that they would not have at 
the post-negotiation stage. 
3. Trade 
Multilateral trade negotiations are presently underway to further liberalize 
the trade regime operating under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. 
Known as the Doha Round, these negotiations have been ongoing since 2001. 
Contentious issues include the extent to which developing countries will reduce 
tariffs on imported goods and the extent to which the United States and the 
European Union will reduce agricultural subsidies.
246
 
In the last few decades, the U.S. political branches have approved major 
trade agreements as ex post congressional-executive agreements rather than 
through subsequent advice and consent. The key advantage of this approach has 
been the fast-track framework legislation, which has enabled these agreements 
to receive prompt up-or-down votes in each house of Congress.
247
 But fast-
track applies only to agreements signed before July 1, 2007,
248
 so any post-
2007 agreement reached in the Doha Round cannot benefit from this process. 
Negotiators in the Doha Round are well aware that this option has been lost—
indeed, there were strong efforts to complete the negotiations prior to fast-
track’s expiration.
249
 One scholar has remarked that “[w]ithout [fast track] 
authority, shepherding any Doha Round agreement through Congress without 
amendment is a virtual impossibility, thus sounding the death knell of the Doha 
Round.”
250
 
Prospective advice and consent offers a possible alternative to an attempt 
to renew fast-track authority. Senators have shown an interest in shaping U.S. 
negotiating positions at Doha—for example, in 2008, fifty-eight Senators 
signed a letter to President Bush urging him not to make further concessions on 
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agricultural subsidies.
251
 By prospectively advising and consenting to a Doha 
Round treaty, the Senate could both strengthen the U.S. negotiating hand and 
make other countries more willing to accommodate this hand, since they would 
have Senate precommitment in return. Prospective advice and consent would 
also provide any Senators with strong views about the Senate’s constitutional 
prerogative in treatymaking a chance to reassert this prerogative in the trade 
context. 
It may seem odd to consider prospective advice and consent for an issue 
where the constitutional and precedential footing of ex post congressional-
executive agreements is most strongly established. I suggest it because there 
may be circumstances under which prospective advice and consent would be 
achievable but a renewal of fast-track would not be. First, as a matter of 
process, trade is an issue on which obtaining the votes of two-thirds of the 
Senate may sometimes be as easy as, or easier than, both sixty votes in the 
Senate and a majority of the House, with its heavily localized voting 
interests.
252
 By way of example, the most recent fast-track authorization 
squeaked through the House but sailed through the Senate: the initial voting 
margins were 216-215 and 66-30, respectively, while the votes on the 
conference version were 215-212 and 64-34.
253
 Second, prospective advice and 
consent also offers a potentially quicker and easier process in that it needs to go 
only through one house, as opposed to two houses and reconciliation. Third, the 
fact that prospective advice and consent can be tailored offers the Senate 
considerable flexibility in terms of structure. The Senate can vary its level of 
precommitment based on the extent to which it reserves an option of 
subsequent review.
254
 There is a trade-off here: the weaker the level of 
precommitment, the more willing the Senate may be to make it but the less 
other countries can rely on it. 
The President can weigh those factors and others in deciding whether to 
seek prospective advice and consent or renewal of fast-track authority for the 
Doha Round (or, for that matter, subsequent advice and consent or purely ex 
post congressional approval). What is desirable and achievable will vary based 
on the precise timing and political context. Ex post congressional-executive 
agreements may well be the best way of getting trade agreements through in 
most circumstances, especially if substantial implementing legislation will be 
required in any event.
255
 Under some circumstances, however, prospective 
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advice and consent could prove the most effective approach. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As presently used, the Treaty Clause has become a straitjacket. For minor 
treaties, the Senate’s consideration of each individual treaty both slows the 
treatymaking process and limits the number of ratifiable treaties. For major 
multilateral treaties, the costs are greater still: the Senate’s widespread failure 
to approve them hurts the United States in its foreign relations and weakens 
future U.S. negotiating power. The failure of the executive branch to represent 
credibly that it can deliver the Senate has led to an odd anomaly in major 
multilateral treaty negotiations: the United States is both the world’s leading 
superpower and yet “a little bit like the boy who cried wolf.”
256
 
There are a number of possible responses to the challenge of obtaining the 
Senate’s advice and consent to negotiated treaties. One response, of course, is 
just to leave the process as it is and to accept that multilateral treaties marked 
by any notable opposition—even ones like the Law of the Sea Convention that 
have widespread though not universal bipartisan support—will be the subject of 
long or perhaps even endless delays. Another response is to turn away from the 
Treaty Clause and instead process international agreements as sole executive 
agreements or congressional-executive agreements. Since World War II, these 
approaches have been used more frequently, but the constitutionality of sole 
executive agreements on major issues is doubtful at best and the Senate has 
shown itself reluctant to abandon the Treaty Clause in favor of congressional-
executive agreements for major agreements outside the trade context. 
This Article has argued that yet another possible response—prospective 
advice and consent—should be used for certain treaties as an alternative to the 
subsequent advice and consent process. The Treaty Clause leaves the President 
and the Senate with considerable flexibility as to how they can apply it, as 
precedents during and after the Washington Administration confirm. I show 
here that this flexibility is broad enough to allow the Senate to advise and 
consent to treaties prospectively and in broad-brush strokes. As an approach for 
major multilateral treaties, prospective advice and consent can improve the 
likelihoods that the Senate will advise and consent to the President’s power to 
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make a treaty and that other international negotiators will accordingly view 
U.S. negotiators as more credible. It will not always work, but it offers 
improvements over the subsequent advice and consent process. 
A final question is what it would take for the Senate to shift to the use of 
prospective advice and consent for appropriate treaties, as an initial change in 
process can require more effort than its later applications. The time-lines for 
such events are hard to predict, and they may be long ones. The possibility of 
ex post congressional-agreements is mentioned in legal scholarship as early as 
1905,
257
 but they were not clearly used until decades later. As I see it, however, 
there are at least two possible scenarios that would provide the Senate with 
strong incentives to shift. First, if the Senate were to discover that the President 
is using the ex ante congressional-executive process to make agreements that it 
views to be of dubious value, then it might consider prospective advice and 
consent as an alternative process that allows a built-in veto and thus allows the 
Senate to retain considerable oversight. Second, if doubts about Senate 
commitment were obviously weakening the U.S. negotiating position regarding 
a treaty that had widespread although not complete bipartisan support, then the 
Senate would have a strong incentive to consider prospective advice and 
consent. In either situation, prospective advice and consent offers clear 
benefits, and this Article has shown that it is a constitutionally appropriate tool. 
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